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WESTERN FRONTIER OR FEUDAL SOCIETY?: 
METAPHORS AND PERCEPTIONS OF CYBERSPACE 
By Alfred C. Yen† 
ABSTRACT 
This Article examines how metaphors influence perceptions of cy-
berspace. Among other things, the Article studies the comparison of cy-
berspace to the American western frontier and the metaphor's construc-
tion of cyberspace as a "place" whose natural characteristics guarantee 
freedom and opportunity. This supports an often-made claim that cyber-
space is different from real space, and that government should generally 
refrain from regulating the Internet. 
The Article surveys the basis of the Western Frontier metaphor in 
academic history and popular culture, and concludes that the metaphor 
misleads people to overestimate cyberspace's "natural" ability to guaran-
tee freedom and opportunity. The Article accomplishes this, in part, by 
offering feudal society as a metaphor for cyberspace and showing how 
prominent features of cyberspace correspond to key components of feu-
dal society. The Article does not claim that cyberspace is thoroughly 
feudal, but it does argue that the feudal society metaphor valuably dis-
lodges the Western Frontier metaphor and reminds us that law has an 
important role to play in shaping the future of the Internet. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article offers feudal society as a metaphor for the emerging so-
cial organization of the Internet. It does so to illustrate how metaphors 
shape thinking about the Internet and to challenge the sometimes mislead-
ing comparison of the Internet to the Western Frontier.1 
                                                                                                                         
 1. Examples from academic legal writing include STUART BIEGEL, BEYOND OUR 
CONTROL? CONFRONTING THE LIMITS OF OUR LEGAL SYSTEM IN THE AGE OF CYBER-
SPACE 4, 13-18 (2001) (discussing use of “Wild West” metaphor); Mary Elizabeth 
Fitzgibbons, Foreword to the Fall 1999 Issue, 4-Fall J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 0, at *2 (1999) 
(“Cyberspace has often been compared with the ‘Wild West’ of America’s frontier days. 
This is an apt metaphor.”), available at http://journal.law.ufl.edu/~techlaw/4-
3/Foreword.html; Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, No Regulation, Government Regulation, or 
Self-Regulation: Social Enforcement or Social Contracting for Governance in Cyber-
space, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 475, 475 (1997) (“‘Cyberians’ are present at the 
creation of the jurisdiction of cyberspace and at the closing of the electronic frontier.”); 
Raymond Ku, Foreword: A Brave New Cyberworld?, 22 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 125, 125-
26 (2000) (discussing connections among cyberspace, the electronic frontier, and the 
Western frontier); Shamoil Shipchandler, Note, The Wild Wild Web: Nonregulation as 
the Answer to the Regulatory Question, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 435, 436 (2000) (“To-
day’s Wild West is the Internet.”); David Yan, Virtual Reality: Can We Ride Trademark 
Law to Surf Cyberspace?, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 773, 777 
(2000) (“Originally, however, cyberspace was like the Wild West.”). 
  Examples from general commentators include Andrew P. Morriss, The Wild 
West Meets Cyberspace, THE FREEMAN, vol. 48, No. 7 (July 1998); Paul Ashdown, From 
Wild West To Wild Web: Public Intellectuals & the Cyberspace Frontier, EXECUTIVE 
SPEECHES, vol. 15, No. 2, 699 (2000); John Perry Barlow, Jack In, Young Pioneer!, Key-
note Essay for the 1994 Computerworld College Edition, ¶¶ 6-7, available at 
http://www.eff.org/Infra/virtual_frontier_barlow_eff.article (Aug. 11, 1994) [hereinafter 
Barlow, Jack In] (urging young people to connect to the Internet as one might have urged 
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The application of metaphor to the Internet is entirely sensible. It is an 
unavoidable and useful human habit to compare unfamiliar objects to fa-
miliar ones. People use apt metaphors because they stimulate the imagina-
tion, drawing attention to patterns and possibilities that would otherwise 
have escaped attention. If perceptions stimulated by metaphor become suf-
ficiently ingrained, people may adopt them as reality and make them the 
basis for future beliefs and actions. At the same time, however, it is impor-
tant to separate the application of metaphor from the complete apprehen-
sion of reality. Metaphors work because they provide perspective, but the 
adoption of one perspective necessarily omits insights offered by other 
perspectives. Accordingly, insight gets lost when one metaphor assumes 
enough prominence to crowd other ones out, especially if the prominent 
metaphor has misleading qualities. It therefore makes sense to develop and 
use a balanced set of metaphors when studying any object.2 
                                                                                                                         
a young person to go West); Mitchell Kapor & John Perry Barlow, Across the Electronic 
Frontier, Electronic Frontier Foundation, ¶ 4, available at http://www.eff.org/-
Publications/John_Perry_Barlow/HTML/eff.html (July 10, 1990) (“Cyberspace is a fron-
tier region”); John V. Lombardi, Killer Applications, the Net, and the Wild, Wild, West, 
Address at the Florida Government Technology Conference, ¶ 6, available at 
http://jvlone.com/cyber2.html (Oct. 10, 1995). 
  Examples from the press include Internet Surfing Can Cut Into ‘People Time’, 
UPI, Feb. 16, 2000, ¶¶ 11-14 (comparing Internet to unsettled Western frontier), avail-
able at LEXIS, Nexis library, UPI file; Stephen Pounds, MCI Chairman Sees Internet as 
‘The Wild West’, PALM BEACH POST, Apr. 30, 1995, at 3E; Lawrence J. Siskind, Settling 
the Wild Cyber Frontier: Domain Names Should be Treated as Property, TEX. LAW., 
Nov. 22, 1999, at 43 (“Across the vast expanse of cyberspace, wildcatters are at work, 
staking claims over thousands of domain names, hoping to strike it rich with one or 
more.”); Mark Trumbull, Taming the ‘Wild West’ of the Global Internet, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Nov. 14, 1995, at 12; Dawn Wilensky, The Internet, the Next Retailing Fron-
tier, DISCOUNT STORE NEWS, Dec. 4, 1995, at 6. 
 2. See MILNER S. BALL, LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR, AND THEOL-
OGY 22 (1985) (describing the importance of metaphor in shaping reality, the power of 
“preemptive metaphors,” and the need for “access to alternate metaphors”); Clay Calvert, 
Comment, Regulating Cyberspace: Metaphor, Rhetoric, Reality, and the Framing of Le-
gal Options, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 541, 542-43, 547-49 (1998) (describing 
the use of the information superhighway metaphor for the Internet and its limitations); A. 
Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the 
Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709, 718 (1995) (“As more and more settlers arrive in 
cyberspace, the nature of this new landscape will depend critically on the legal metaphors 
that the colonists choose to bring with them.”); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place, and 
the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming March 2003) 
(discussing the "cyberspace as place" metaphor and, in general, the widespread use of 
metaphors); Bruce P. Keller, The Game’s the Same: Why Gambling in Cyberspace Vio-
lates Federal Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1569, 1571 (1999) (criticizing those who take the 
metaphor of cyberspace as an actual, separate place too literally); F. Gregory Lastowka, 
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Not surprisingly, metaphors shape the perception of Internet reality. Of 
the many metaphors that have been applied to the Internet,3 the most 
prominent and influential has been the imagination of the Internet as a 
separate, new physical place known as “cyberspace” and its comparison to 
America’s Western Frontier. This “Western Frontier” metaphor is both 
powerful and persistent,4 particularly in the United States.5 Americans 
                                                                                                                         
Note, Search Engines, HTML, and Trademarks: What’s the Meta For?, 86 VA. L. REV. 
835, 854-58 (2000) (noting influence and importance of metaphors); Michael J. Madison, 
Rights of Access and the Shape of the Internet, 44 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2003) 
(advocating the development of metaphors connected to experience); Maureen A. 
O’Rourke, Property Rights and Competition on the Internet: In Search of an Appropriate 
Analogy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 561 (2001) (analyzing effect of analogies and meta-
phors on property rights and competition policy for the Internet); Jonathan J. Rusch, Cy-
berspace and the “Devil’s Hatband”, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 577, 578-81 (2000) (noting 
the persistence of the Western Frontier metaphor and advocating the intelligent selection 
of metaphors based on the Western frontier); Timothy Wu, Application Centered Internet 
Analysis, 85 VA. L. REV. 1163 (1999) (criticizing tendency of various commentators who 
allow a single analogy to dominate their analyses of the Internet).  
 3. See EDIAS Software Int’l, LLC v. BASIS Int’l, Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413, 419 (D. 
Ariz. 1996) (noting metaphors that compare the Internet to highways, shopping malls, 
and telephone systems); Jon. M. Garon, Media & Monopoly in the Information Age: 
Slowing the Convergence at the Marketplace of Ideas, 7 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 491, 
589 (1999) (referring to a “portal metaphor” for the Internet); I. Trotter Hardy, Copyright 
Owners’ Rights and Users’ Privileges on the Internet: Computer RAM “Copies”: A Hit 
or a Myth? Historical Perspectives on Caching as a Microcosm of Current Copyright 
Concerns, 22 DAYTON L. REV. 423, 436-37 (1997) (comparing the Internet to a cardio-
vascular system and a highway system); Andy Johnson-Laird, The Anatomy of the Inter-
net Meets the Body of the Law, 22 DAYTON L. REV. 465, 469 (1997) (adding the metaphor 
of “global copying machine” to the “list of Internet metaphors”); Stephen McGeady, The 
Digital Reformation: Total Freedom, Risk, and Responsibility, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
137, 139-41 (1996) (referring to comparisons between the Internet and the Gutenberg 
printing press, and further using the Protestant reformation as a metaphor for the Inter-
net); Tom W. Bell, Book Review, 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 185, 186 (1997) (reviewing 
HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., LAW AND THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY (1996) (criticizing 
the information superhighway metaphor for the Internet as “outmoded” and comparing 
the Internet to the ocean).  
 4. See Rusch, supra note 4, at 577-79 (discussing the pervasive comparison of cy-
berspace to the Wild West); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & 
Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 885 (2000) (“The Internet has often been 
compared to the Wild West, a frontier society free from the stifling conventions of civili-
zation, and some have even argued that defamation law is an unnecessary anachronism in 
this new society.”); Andrew P. Morriss, Miners, Vigilantes, & Cattlemen: Overcoming 
Free Rider Problems in the Private Provision of Law, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 581, 
687 (“The ‘Wild West’ is a frequently applied metaphor for the Internet.”); Steven 
Hetcher, Climbing the Walls of Your Electronic Cage, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1916, 1916 
(2000) (noting frequent comparison of cyberspace to an unexplored frontier with refer-
ence to the American West). 
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imagine the Western Frontier as an unexplored place of abundant land, 
freedom, and opportunity. The West’s remoteness ensured the absence of 
legal and social constraints associated with the civilized East. Those un-
happy with Eastern constraints found freedom by moving west, where 
abundant land and resources ensured their prosperity.  
One can see the Internet in a similar way. Cyberspace “pioneers” ex-
perience the Internet as a special place devoid of the rules and constraints 
of “real space.” This makes cyberspace a place where people find freedom 
from real space rules. Additionally, many who have ventured into cyber-
space have discovered that significant economic opportunities exist there. 
The Internet has become the electronic frontier from which freedom and 
prosperity will emerge. 
Like all metaphors, the Western Frontier metaphor provides a particu-
lar perspective on the object described. The metaphor constructs the Inter-
net as a version of the Western Frontier, a historical phenomenon that glo-
rifies individuality and the benefits of minimal government. Put slightly 
differently, the Western Frontier metaphor suggests that the Internet will 
permit everyone to live a modern, improved version of America’s west-
ward expansion. Like the American West, the unregulated Internet has in-
herent characteristics that support unlimited economic opportunity, equal-
ity, individual freedom, and even political liberty.6 Private arrangements 
reached in cyberspace therefore have a particularly strong claim to legiti-
macy because the Internet makes people free and equal individuals who 
                                                                                                                         
 5. This Article recognizes that the perspectives under discussion have a distinctly 
American orientation. This is hardly surprising, as the Internet originally developed under 
the auspices of the United States government. See infra notes 10-12 and accompanying 
text. Moreover, the Western Frontier metaphor operates by referring to a part of history 
dear to many Americans. Accordingly, the metaphor’s effect is strongest on Americans, 
the very people who have had the largest influence over the Internet’s development and 
operation. Cf. BIEGEL, supra note 1, at 125 (“[T]he culture of the Internet is predomi-
nantly American at this point in time.”). Indeed, Justin Hughes, a professor at Cardozo 
Law School, suggested to the author that perceptions of the Internet would be very differ-
ent if other countries had been primarily responsible for its development. Exploration of 
these possibilities would undoubtedly be interesting, but is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle. 
 6. See David G. Post, The “Unsettled Paradox”: The Internet, the State, and the 
Consent of the Governed, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 521, 539 (1998) (arguing that 
the unregulated Internet naturally guarantees consent of the governed); David R. Johnson 
& David G. Post, The New ‘Civic Virtue’ of the Internet, ¶ 7, in THE EMERGING INTER-
NET: THE 1998 REPORT OF THE INSTITUTE FOR INFORMATION STUDIES (The Aspen Insti-
tute ed., 1998), available at http://www.cli.org/paper4.htm; Internet Surfing Can Cut Into 
‘People Time’, supra note 1, ¶¶ 11-14 (reporting idea that Internet’s "endless frontier" 
expands social horizons). 
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cannot exploit each other unfairly. These observations support the argu-
ment that society should accept the Internet and its developing social prac-
tices “as is,” with minimal interference from government.7 
The use of the Western Frontier metaphor to support minimal Internet 
regulation is not, in and of itself, problematic. Minimal regulation could be 
a wise strategy for the Internet, and a metaphor that clarifies the relevant 
arguments helps. However, the Western Frontier metaphor’s prominence 
crowds out other equally important perspectives. If society thinks of the 
Internet as a new Western Frontier, it will often refrain from using law to 
rectify problems in cyberspace because legal regulation does not fit com-
                                                                                                                         
 7. See infra Part III.C. Perhaps the most colorful statement of this view comes 
from John Perry Barlow’s “Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,” which 
reads: 
Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and 
steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of the Mind. On behalf 
of the future, I ask you of the past to leave me alone. You are not wel-
come among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather.  
We have no elected government, nor are we likely to have one, so I ad-
dress you with no greater authority than that with which liberty itself 
always speaks. I declare the global social space we are building to be 
naturally independent of the tyrannies you seek to impose on us. You 
have no moral right to rule us nor do you possess any methods of en-
forcement we have true reason to fear. 
¶¶ 1-2, available at http://www.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html (Feb. 8, 1996). 
See also Paulina Borsook, CYBERSELFISH: A CRITICAL ROMP THROUGH THE TERRIBLY 
LIBERTARIAN CULTURE OF HIGH TECH 1-27 (2000) (describing the relationship between 
high tech culture and libertarian politics). 
  Professor Andrew P. Morriss offers a more developed version of this argument 
in his essay The Wild West Meets Cyberspace, supra note 1. Professor Morriss directly 
compares cyberspace to the Western frontier, noting that both are characterized by the 
general absence of state regulation. He goes on to tout the benefits of these laissez-faire 
conditions: 
The nineteenth-century west was a place of almost limitless opportunity 
where, through market transactions and voluntary action, tens of thou-
sands of strangers developed institutions that allowed them to take 
advantage of that opportunity in communities of peace and good order. 
Today we are only beginning the Information Rush. Like a forty-niner 
trying to imagine modern-day San Francisco while looking at the mud 
flats and tents of his day, we cannot foresee what forms the spontane-
ous order now evolving in cyberspace will take. What we can do is re-
ject the use of the metaphor of “Wild West” as a justification for state 
intervention. Whether the demand is for enforcement authorities to re-
strict cryptography or antitrust regulators to crush competition, inter-
vention will stifle freedom. If we are lucky, the Internet will turn out to 
be just like the American Wild West. 
Id. ¶ 22. 
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fortably into the Western Frontier metaphor’s romanticized tale of pro-
gress. This troubling use of the Western Frontier metaphor conveniently 
overlooks historical episodes of injustice and exploitation in the West8 that 
appropriate legal regulation might have prevented. We must therefore 
think of ways to challenge the Western Frontier metaphor’s prominence so 
that alternate perspectives can emerge.  
This Article elaborates on the foregoing observations and then offers 
feudal society as an alternate Internet metaphor. The metaphor may seem a 
bit odd because the Internet seems far removed from a society that flour-
ished in Europe over 500 years ago. Nevertheless, this Article will show 
that prominent features of cyberspace map easily onto feudal society.9 
This does not mean that cyberspace is thoroughly feudal, or that feudal 
society is the best or only metaphor to apply to the Internet. A feudal soci-
ety perspective simply facilitates appreciation of the Internet in a way that 
the Western Frontier metaphor does not. The Feudal Society metaphor 
weakens the ideology of minimal Internet regulation by reminding us that 
government regulation played a significant role in dismantling undesirable 
aspects of feudal society. The claim is not that the Feudal Society meta-
phor is superior to the Western Frontier metaphor, or that a particular ide-
ology of Internet regulation is necessarily correct. Instead, using both 
metaphors allows a richer appreciation of the Internet, its influence on so-
ciety, and the possible role of law in regulating that influence. 
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part II describes the Internet, its op-
eration, and the perception of the Internet as a separate physical space. 
Part III analyzes the Western Frontier metaphor and its relationship to ar-
guments in favor of minimal Internet regulation. It briefly explores flaws 
in the metaphor’s account of Western Frontier history and concludes that 
the metaphor’s influence should be countered by the development of new 
metaphors that highlight the things hidden by the Western Frontier image. 
Part IV presents feudal society as an alternate, equally plausible metaphor 
for the Internet. Part V considers some of the implications of applying the 
Feudal Society metaphor to the Internet, including the use of law to blunt 
emerging feudal practices in cyberspace. Part VI concludes by urging 
                                                                                                                         
 8. See, e.g., DAVID HAWARD BAIN, EMPIRE EXPRESS: BUILDING THE FIRST TRANS-
CONTINENTAL RAILROAD 205-09 (1999) (describing the role that exploitative and racist 
employment practices played in building the transcontinental railroad); ROBERT M. UT-
LEY, HIGH NOON IN LINCOLN: VIOLENCE ON THE WESTERN FRONTIER (1987) (describing 
numerous acts of theft, fraud, exploitation, rape and murder perpetrated by individuals in 
Lincoln County, New Mexico during a late 19th century period of ineffective govern-
ment). 
 9. See infra Part IV. 
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more careful thought about legal regulation of the Internet and by offering 
some general ideas about the application of metaphors to the Internet. 
II. THE INTERNET AND CYBERSPACE 
Any discussion of the Internet as a “place” must first deal with the 
phenomenon of cyberspace. Cyberspace is the virtual space created by op-
eration of the Internet, a network of computers that share information with 
each other.10 The Internet has its origins in a number of experimental net-
works created and operated with funding from the United States govern-
ment. The earliest of these was a 1960s Department of Defense project 
called the “ARPANET.”11 The ARPANET was eventually joined in the 
1980s by the NSFNET, which was designed and operated by the National 
Science Foundation.12 
Over time, these networks grew and developed into the modern Inter-
net as private parties gained access to the network and the operation of the 
network passed to private, for-profit entities.13 Now, millions of people 
can connect to the Internet.14 This does not mean, however, that everyone 
connects to the Internet the same way. A relatively small number of large 
entities, like major corporations and the government, build and maintain 
the high-speed lines that form the Internet’s backbone.15 They provide 
Internet access to themselves. By contrast, most entities and individuals 
gain access to the Internet from someone else, creating a hierarchy of 
computers. Operators of the Internet’s backbone are at the top of the hier-
archy. They then support a second level of computers by connecting them 
to the Internet. Those at the second level can then support a third, and so 
on. This hierarchy continues until no further delegation of Internet access 
occurs.  
                                                                                                                         
 10. See BARRY M. LEINER ET AL., A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INTERNET, version 3.31, 
available at http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml (last revised Aug. 4, 2000). 
For more detail, see Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Fool Us Once Shame on You—Fool 
Us Twice Shame on Us: What We Can Learn from the Privatizations of the Internet 
Backbone Network and the Domain Name System, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 89 (2001).  
 11. See Kesan & Shah, supra note 10, at 101-03. 
 12. See id. at 103. 
 13. See id. at 111-19. 
 14. A major impediment to genuine worldwide availability of Internet access is the 
lack of adequate wiring in the third world, particularly sub-Saharan Africa. See Hiawatha 
Bray, Africa Goes Online, BOSTON GLOBE, July 22, 2001 at A1 (describing the lack of 
Internet access in Africa and measures being taken to remedy the problem), available at 
2001 WL 3943399.  
 15. See PRESTON GRALLA, HOW THE INTERNET WORKS 5-7 (4th ed. 1998).  
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Most private individuals connect to the Internet at the bottom of this 
hierarchy through Internet Service Providers, or “ISPs.” The ISP generally 
provides a connection to the Internet, along with e-mail and other basic 
technology, in return for a fee. Information travels to and from the indi-
vidual’s computer through the ISP’s computer, which in turn forwards that 
information up the hierarchy and on to the Internet. In short, the ISP acts 
as the individual’s “gateway” to the Internet.16 
The existence of cyberspace owes a good deal to the sheer number of 
individuals, businesses, and other entities now connected to the Internet. 
However, equal credit must go to the increased processing power of mod-
ern personal computers, faster transmission of data over the Internet, and 
specialized software that make it practical to send text, sound and image 
files over the Internet. Consider the possibilities now available to the typi-
cal Internet user. First, the multi-media capabilities of Internet browsers 
allow users to “surf” the Internet to view a virtually unlimited number of 
files that display text, images and sound. Hyperlinking means that a sim-
ple click of a button takes our user from files stored in one computer to 
those stored on another. Second, e-mail and real-time communication 
software allow Internet users to “chat” or otherwise communicate with 
each other interactively.17  
Together, these technologies create the illusion that logging on to the 
Internet takes the user to the separate place of cyberspace. No one exists in 
cyberspace without an Internet account. However, once a person estab-
lishes an Internet account, she can visit cyberspace anytime she likes. 
Logging on gives her an apparently separate virtual life. In cyberspace, 
there are lots of “places” to “go.” Cyberspace contains many inhabitants, 
some of whom will be “seen” only in cyberspace.18 She can make friends, 
fall in love, and buy goods and services for her “real space life” while liv-
ing her virtual cyberspace life. She can even adopt a new identity.19 How-
                                                                                                                         
 16. See id. at 49-53.  
 17. For examples and descriptions of chat software see America Online, Inc., AOL 
Instant Messenger, available at http://www.aim.com/index.adp (last visited Nov. 15, 
2002); ICQ, Inc., What is ICQ?, available at http://www.icq.com/products/-
whatisicq.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2002); and Microsoft, Inc., .NET Messenger Service, 
available at http://messenger.msn.com (last visited Nov. 15, 2002). For an example of 
video chat software, see Eyeball Networks Inc., Products, available at http://www.eye-
ball.com/products/index.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2002). 
 18. See HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING ON THE 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 17-37, 176-88 (1993) (describing communications among people 
who had never met in “real space”), available at http://www.rheingold.com/vc/book. 
 19. See Brenda Danet, Text as Mask: Gender, Play, and Performance on the Inter-
net, in CYBERSOCIETY 2.0: REVISITING COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMMUNICATION AND 
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ever, all of this exists only as long as she is logged on to Internet. The act 
of turning off her computer removes her from cyberspace as surely as a 
flight from New York to Paris removes a traveler from the United States. 
Of course, cyberspace is not a real place. Spatial terms such as “cyber-
space,” “web site,” and “visiting” locations in cyberspace are all part of 
the metaphor commonly applied to the experience of sitting at a desk, log-
ging on to the Internet, and viewing files sent by other Internet users. At 
first inspection, the maintenance of this fiction seems absurd. However, 
anyone who has spent significant time “surfing the ’net” understands the 
power of the cyberspace concept, and the numerous Internet identities dif-
ferent from the people who maintain them demonstrate that people believe 
in cyberspace as a separate place and live it every day. Even if the cold-
blooded realist rejects the whole thing as mass delusion,20 the fact remains 
that society talks about cyberspace as if it were real, and it is undeniably 
true that something of social significance is happening “out there.” Ac-
cordingly, it is important to study the consequences of thinking about the 
Internet through metaphors that construct it as a special, separate place.21  
III. COMPARING CYBERSPACE TO THE WESTERN 
FRONTIER  
A. The Frontier Thesis and American Popular Culture 
The Western Frontier metaphor is influential because it rests upon a 
serious intellectual thesis that popular culture has adopted, idealized and 
disseminated. This combination of serious history and popular culture has 
                                                                                                                         
COMMUNITY 129-158 (Steven G. Jones ed., 1998) (describing experimentation with gen-
der identity on the Internet). This point was perhaps made most vividly in a cartoon that 
appeared in the New Yorker magazine in which one dog seated at a computer says to 
another, “On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog.” Peter Steiner, NEW YORKER, 
July 5, 1993, available at www.cartoonbank.com. 
 20. Interestingly, William Gibson, the science fiction author generally given credit 
for coining the term “cyberspace,” described it as “a consensual hallucination.” WILLIAM 
GIBSON, NEUROMANCER 51 (1st ed. Ace Books 1984). 
 21. See Madison, supra note 2 (identifying a rough consensus on the Internet as a 
place metaphor); Hunter, supra note 2 (identifying widespread adoption of the cyber-
space as place metaphor and describing the importance of physical metaphors to human 
cognitive systems); Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing March 2003) (identifying and analyzing use of the cyberspace as place metaphor). Cf. 
Jonathan G. S. Koppell, No “There” There, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug. 2000, at 16 (not-
ing the influence and likely persistence of the term “cyberspace” and urging careful un-
derstanding of its consequences). 
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created an enduring image of the Western Frontier whose shortcomings 
are difficult to diagnose and engage. 
Frederick Jackson Turner first advanced the “frontier thesis” in 1893, 
thereby attributing the development of American society and American 
virtues to the Western Frontier.22 Turner wrote: 
American social development has been continually beginning 
over again on the frontier. This perennial rebirth, this fluidity of 
American life, this expansion westward with its new opportuni-
ties, its continuous touch with the simplicity of primitive society, 
furnish the forces dominating the American character. The true 
point of view in the history of this nation is not the Atlantic 
coast, it is the Great West.23 
According to Turner, the West’s free availability of unsettled land cre-
ated the economic opportunities and social values that made America 
great. Individuals without wealth could always move to the West to take 
advantage of its abundant wildlife and fertile soil.24 If a settler had suffi-
cient initiative and persistence, prosperity would surely follow.25 Simi-
larly, people who felt oppressed could liberate themselves in the West be-
cause its unsettled land was remote from the oppressive state and its legal 
regulations.26 There, in conditions close to the state of nature, people could 
discover on their own the uniquely American values that support human 
flourishing.27 Those values would, of course, include self-reliance, indi-
                                                                                                                         
 22. Frederick Jackson Turner, The Significance of the Frontier in American History, 
in REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION FOR 1893 199-227 (1894), re-
printed in FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 1-38 (1st 
ed. Henry Holt & Co. 1920) [hereinafter TURNER, FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY]. 
 23. TURNER, FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 22, at 2-3. 
 24. Id. at 18 (claiming that availability of natural resources attracted settlers to the 
West).  
 25. Frederick Jackson Turner, The Problem of the West, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 
1896 [hereinafter TURNER, Problems of the West], reprinted in TURNER, FRONTIER IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 212 (“The West was another name for opportunity. Here were mines 
to be seized, fertile valleys to be pre-empted, all the natural resources open to the 
shrewdest and the boldest.”). 
 26. Frederick Jackson Turner, Contributions of the West to the American Democ-
racy, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan. 1903 [hereinafter TURNER, Contributions of the West], 
reprinted in TURNER, FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 259 (“Whenever social condi-
tions tended to crystallize in the east, whenever capital tended to press upon labor or po-
litical restraints to impede the freedom of the mass, there was this gate of escape to the 
free conditions of the frontier.”). 
 27. According to Turner, the harshness of frontier living forced settlers to abandon 
the trappings of life governed by social convention and the state. Instead, settlers got back 
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vidualism, equality, and a commitment to democracy. People of like mind 
could then find each other and create new settlements, towns, cities and 
states superior to the oppressive ones in the East.28 
It would be remarkable if natural conditions guaranteed economic and 
social opportunity for even a brief period of any country’s history. Ac-
cording to Turner’s frontier thesis, the West provided these blessings to 
America from the time that Europeans arrived in North America to the set-
tlement of the West Coast. The process of settling the Western Frontier, of 
finding economic opportunity and social progress in the bounty of free and 
unsettled land, became the defining feature of American society. Ameri-
cans are American because they settled the West.29 American society pro-
gresses because regular contact with the Western wilderness implies a 
continual return to basic values, their reaffirmation, and the improvement 
of American democracy. America is a better place, and Americans are 
                                                                                                                         
to the basics—those things that were truly necessary to life. This allowed settlers to rein-
vent themselves in a distinctly American way: 
In short, at the frontier the environment is at first too strong for the 
man. He must accept the conditions which it furnishes, or perish, and so 
he fits himself into the Indian clearings and follows the Indian trails. 
Little by little he transforms the wilderness, but the outcome is not the 
old Europe, not simply the development of Germanic germs, any more 
than the first phenomenon was a case of reversion to the Germanic 
mark. The fact is, that here is a new product that is American. 
TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 22, at 4. Turner further be-
lieved that the society built by Americans uniquely emphasized basic human virtues and 
avoided the superfluous trappings of European civilization. TURNER, Problems of the 
West, supra note 25, at 213 (“The United States is unique in the extent to which the indi-
vidual has been given an open field, unchecked by restraints of an old social order, or of 
scientific administration of government.”). 
 28. Turner’s writing captures these thoughts with striking clarity:  
Most important of all has been the fact that an area of free land has con-
tinually lain on the western border of the settled area of the United 
States. . . . These free lands promoted individualism, economic equal-
ity, the freedom to rise, democracy. Men would not accept inferior 
wages and a permanent position of social subordination when this 
promised land of freedom and equality was theirs for the taking. Who 
would rest content under oppressive legislative conditions when with a 
slight effort he might reach a land where in to become a co-worker in 
the building of free cities and free States on the lines of his own ideal? 
TURNER, Contributions of the West, supra note 26, at 259. See also TURNER, Problems of 
the West, supra note 25, at 205-06 (describing continual rebirth of American society 
through interaction with the Western frontier). 
 29. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.  
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even better people,30 because of the Western Frontier. Indeed, America 
must have a frontier to remain authentically American.31  
The frontier thesis became one of the most influential ideas of the 20th 
century. During the period before World War I, most historians accepted 
the thesis as true.32 Even now, after considerable criticism from many cor-
ners, the thesis remains influential with historians33 and, perhaps more im-
portantly, in popular culture.34 Many Westerns—both novels and mov-
ies—tell stories about Americans struggling to carve lives from untamed 
land, uncomplicated virtues, and the triumph of good individuals in the 
absence of the state.35 Indeed, the popularization of the frontier thesis is in 
large part responsible for its influence when applied to cyberspace. 
                                                                                                                         
 30. Turner quotes an unnamed representative from western Virginia: 
The Old Dominion has long been celebrated for producing great ora-
tors; the ablest metaphysicians in policy; men that can split hairs in all 
abstruse questions of political economy. But at home, or when they re-
turn from Congress, they have negroes to fan them asleep. But a Penn-
sylvania, a New York, an Ohio, or a western Virginia statesman, 
though far inferior in logic, metaphysics, and rhetoric to an old Virginia 
statesman, has this advantage, that when he returns home he takes off 
his coat and takes hold of the plow. This gives him bone and muscle, 
sir, and preserves his republican principles pure and uncontaminated. 
TURNER, FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 22, at 31. 
 31. Id. at 37-38 (reflecting on the disappearance of the Western frontier and predict-
ing that American energy previously spent on the frontier will “continually demand a 
wider field for its exercise”).  
 32. See Richard W. Etulain, Preface to DOES THE FRONTIER EXPERIENCE MAKE 
AMERICA EXCEPTIONAL? at v (Richard W. Etulain ed., 1999) [hereinafter FRONTIER EX-
PERIENCE].  
 33. Id. (“[N]o essay or book about American history attracts as much attention, pro 
and con, as Turner’s essay ["The Significance of the Frontier in American History"].”).  
 34. See Martin Ridge, The Life of an Idea: The Significance of Frederick Jackson 
Turner’s Frontier Thesis, 40 MONTANA, THE MAG. OF W. HIST. 2 (1991), reprinted in 
FRONTIER EXPERIENCE, supra note 32, at 74. Ridge writes: 
Turner’s masterpiece, like Braque’s cubist work—“Man with a Gui-
tar”—has achieved a special place in American culture. It changed a vi-
tal part of the scholarly community, and its rhetoric has been absorbed 
into our everyday language. It changed the way most Americans con-
tinue to see themselves and their institutions. Moreover, it changed the 
way they are seen by others throughout the world. People who have 
never read “The Significance of the Frontier in American History” or 
heard of Frederick Jackson Turner—as is true of Braque and cubism—
identify with it and recognize in it portions of a reality. 
Id. at 84. 
 35. See Michael T. Marsden, Savior in the Saddle: The Sagebrush Testament, in 
FOCUS ON THE WESTERN 93 (John G. Nachbar ed., 1974) (noting that the Turner argu-
ment “is acted out time and again as Western after Western unfolds on movie screens 
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For example, consider Shane, a novel by Jack Schaefer that was made 
into a movie of the same title.36 The story is set in Wyoming of 1889. The 
reader learns that the novel’s hero, Shane, is a gunman who divulges little 
of his past.37 Shane literally wears the marks of his hard life in the West, 
but that life has molded him into a man of uncommon physical strength 
and character.38 Shane possesses direct manners and virtues so obvious 
that, despite his gunfighter’s demeanor, good people trust him.39 
In an attempt to leave his gunfighting days behind, Shane becomes a 
helper at the small homestead farm of Joe and Marian Starrett. Joe’s son, 
Bobby, worships Shane as a hero, as do Joe and Marian in their own 
way.40 At first, Shane’s very presence seems to lighten the pressure the 
Starretts face from Fletcher, a cattle rancher bent on running the Starretts 
and 6 other homesteaders off the open range.41 Fletcher’s ranching busi-
ness and his apparent disregard of the homesteaders’ legal claims establish 
a threat to the life and community that the good and decent homesteaders 
want to build.  
Over time Fletcher’s intimidation increases, but Shane—forged by the 
Wild West into the great individual of supreme moral virtue and physical 
strength—champions the homesteaders. Eventually, Fletcher hires a gun-
                                                                                                                         
across this land”). See also JOHN G. CAWELTI, THE SIX-GUN MYSTIQUE (2nd ed. 1984) 
(analyzing the popularity and influence of the Western genre). For classic Western nov-
els, see JAMES FENIMORE COOPER, THE PIONEERS (James D. Wallace ed., Oxford Univ. 
Press 1991) (1823); OWEN WISTER, THE VIRGINIAN (1902); ZANE GREY, RIDERS OF THE 
PURPLE SAGE (1912). For classic Western movies, see How the West was Won (Cinerama 
and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1963); Shane (Paramount Pictures 1953).  
 36. JACK SCHAEFER, SHANE: THE CRITICAL EDITION (James C. Work ed., 1984) 
(1949) [hereinafter SHANE: CRITICAL EDITION] (Reprinting a restored version of Shane 
along with a selection of scholarly essays; all citations are to this edition). There are, of 
course, many distinguishable variations of the Western genre in both literature and film. 
See CAWELTI, supra note 35, at 113-19 (listing Western films by subject). At least one 
other writer has noted the significance of the Shane story to the comparison of cyberspace 
to the Western frontier. BIEGEL, supra note 1, at 14-15 (discussing the movie version of 
Shane). 
 37. SHANE: CRITICAL EDITION, supra note 36, at 77. 
 38. Id. at 62-63. Shane wears clothes made of fine material, but they are patched and 
stained. The material marks him as a person of status, but the patches and stains place his 
origin outside of civilization. Id. Later, the narrator's father tells his son that “[t]here’s 
more right about [Shane] than most any man you’re ever likely to meet.” Id. at 129. 
 39. Id. at 74-75. 
 40. From the outset, Marian is attracted to Shane. Their unrealizable affection for 
one another is portrayed as natural, indeed inevitable, because of Shane’s superior quali-
ties as a man. Even Joe recognizes that Shane is a better man than he. Id. at 203.  
 41. Id. at 133 (“The only shadow over our valley, the recurrent trouble between 
Fletcher and us homesteaders, seemed to have faded away.”).  
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man named Wilson to kill Joe because Joe is the homesteader with the grit 
to hold the others together. Shane, realizing that he cannot be a farmer, 
resumes gunfighting and kills Wilson and Fletcher in a showdown. Shane 
then rides out of town, leaving Joe to lead the homesteaders in the creation 
of homes and a prosperous community where young Bobby can grow up 
“strong and straight.”42 
Shane presents a glorified, idealized version of Turner’s frontier the-
sis.43 Shane’s physical prowess includes gunfighting, a skill acquired only 
in the Wild West where the absence of the state forces individuals to pro-
tect themselves. Yet the Wild West has also made Shane uncommonly vir-
tuous. The combination of physical and moral qualities taken from the 
West enables Shane to protect the homesteaders. Joe Starrett and his fel-
low homesteaders struggle to carve good lives from the Wild West. The 
land itself accepts their presence with great reluctance, as Joe discovers in 
his vain efforts to remove a large stump from his yard.44 Even the home-
steaders’ human antagonists represent a combination of human avarice 
and the Wild West. Fletcher’s open range cattle business is one that could 
only have developed in the Wild West. Similarly, Wilson and his gun-
fighting skills exist only because of the Wild West. The absence of law 
enforcement removes the state from the equation, making self-reliance and 
individual initiative key factors in the story. In short, Shane is a tale of 
how the self-reliant initiative of a strong, virtuous person can overcome 
injustice and ensure the prosperity of an entire community. 
The fusion of popular culture and the frontier thesis is highly signifi-
cant. If only historians had considered the frontier thesis, it would have 
gained limited exposure and criticism would have blunted its force. As 
noted earlier, Turner’s work expresses great optimism that a society 
forged in the West would be a great one devoid of imperfections associ-
ated with the Old World.45 However, many historians who came after 
                                                                                                                         
 42. Id. at 263. 
 43. See generally James C. Work, Settlement Waves and Coordinate Forces in 
Shane, 14 W. AM. LITERATURE 191 (1979), reprinted in SHANE: CRITICAL EDITION, su-
pra note 36, at 307 (discussing Shane as a story about the interaction between different 
groups of settlers amid the backdrop of the Wild West). 
 44. SHANE: CRITICAL EDITION, supra note 36, at 82-84. Joe describes the stump to 
Shane: “That’s the millstone round my neck. That’s the one fool thing about this place I 
haven’t licked yet. But I will. There’s no wood ever grew can stand up to a man that’s got 
the strength and the will to keep hammering at it.” Id. The language quoted fairly rings 
with the notion that individual initiative is the characteristic needed to tame the West. It is 
also no coincidence that the stump gives way when Joe gets help from Shane, a man im-
bued with the raw power of the Wild West. 
 45. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. 
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Turner have noted that he simply overlooked the American West’s history 
of violence against indigenous peoples, racist sentiments against Mexican 
and Asian immigrants, subordination of women, and avaricious exploita-
tion of the land. For them, Turner’s thesis could not be right because the 
society predicted by Turner surely would have avoided these tragic mis-
takes.46 Accordingly, many academic historians now consider the Turner 
thesis a myth.47 
By contrast, popular culture has romanticized the frontier thesis and 
practically guaranteed its public acceptance. Movies and novels reach 
many more people than academic writings do. Criticism generally directed 
at academic writing rarely interferes with the public’s perception of the 
romanticized West presented in Western movies and novels. Stories about 
the natural qualities of the Western Frontier, the inherent virtues it in-
stilled, and the inevitable triumph of good, self-reliant people are told over 
and over again to an accepting public, hungry for more.48 Popular culture 
capitalizes on the loss of the Western Frontier to create American nostal-
gia for the frontier’s return. This nostalgia helps idealize the Western 
Frontier as a place where optimism should prevail because the very nature 
of the Western Frontier guarantees a good outcome. Frederick Jackson 
Turner could never have promoted his ideas this effectively.49  
B. Cyberspace and the Western Frontier 
Events of the 20th century and America’s internalization of the frontier 
thesis have created conditions ripe for the application of the Western Fron-
                                                                                                                         
 46. See, e.g., RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PROGRESSIVE HISTORIANS: TURNER, 
BEARD, PARRINGTON 103-06 (1968) (criticizing Turner for allowing patriotism to over-
whelm his objectivity); DONALD WORSTER, UNDER WESTERN SKIES 7-13 (1992) (criticiz-
ing Turner for being uncritical and narrow in his perspective); HENRY NASH SMITH, VIR-
GIN LAND: THE AMERICAN WEST AS SYMBOL AND MYTH 250-60 (1950) (describing and 
criticizing Turner’s thesis); John Mack Faragher, The Frontier Trail: Rethinking Turner 
and Reimagining the American West, 98 AM. HIST. REV. 106 (1993) (reviewing five 
works of “new Western history”). 
 47. See WORSTER, supra note 46, at 12-18 (describing a “new Western history” that 
is “beyond myth” and setting forth its agenda of paying due regard to the voices of “in-
vaded and subject peoples of the West,” the economic drive behind a “ruthless assault on 
nature,” and the role of power and hierarchy in the West). 
 48. Cf. CAWELTI, supra note 35, at 110-13 (presenting a three-page list of 106 major 
Western films from 1903 to 1969). Shane itself was retold many times. It first appeared 
as a serial in a magazine, then as a novel, then as a movie, and finally as a television se-
ries. Furthermore, its general plot outline has been recycled in the movie Pale Rider, star-
ring American tough guy Clint Eastwood. 
 49. See BIEGEL, supra note 1, at 12 (“It is generally agreed that the Wild West im-
agery of popular culture comes not from history books but from the Western film.”).  
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tier metaphor to the Internet. The upheavals of the twentieth century—two 
world wars, the Viet Nam experience, and the moral struggles of the civil 
rights movement—have contributed to a collective sense that America 
needs to revisit its fundamental values in order to chart its future course. 
Under the frontier thesis, such renewal would ordinarily occur in the wil-
derness of the Western Frontier, land that is now largely civilized. Even 
where significant tracts of land remain uninhabited, the state extends its 
reach, making it impossible for brave individuals to found new communi-
ties on values developed in the absence of the state. 
Not surprisingly, Americans have been looking for a new frontier. 
Widely accepted national boundaries make the occupation of new lands 
impossible and rule out the possibility of actual land-based frontiers. 
Space and the ocean are candidates to be new frontiers, but so far the 
technical obstacles are too great. The Internet, however, appears to be just 
the ticket, and a number of American writers have promoted it that way—
not just for America, but potentially the world.50 Cyberspace may be vir-
tual space, but its characteristics resemble a romanticized Turnerian West-
ern Frontier, where the state seems largely absent.51 This seeming absence 
makes cyberspace a dangerous wilderness characterized by free pornogra-
phy, “spam,” identity theft, rampant copyright infringement, gambling, 
and hacking.52 Its technological nature also makes cyberspace a difficult 
                                                                                                                         
 50. As John V. Lombardi, former president of the University of Florida, has written: 
Cyberspace is the next frontier. Not space, not the undersea world, but 
cyberspace. Like the stylized world of the American wild West, cyber-
space is a vast, unmeasured resource. Like the lands of the American 
frontier, it exists in an apparently trackless wilderness filled with un-
known riches and opportunities, ungoverned and wild, available and 
unclaimed. 
Lombardi, supra note 1, ¶ 6. Similarly, Paul Ashdown, a professor of journalism at the 
University of Tennessee, has noted: 
The Western space became outer space as we turned our attention from 
Gunsmoke and Bonanza to Star Trek and Star Wars. Ronald Reagan 
brought us briefly back to the Frontier in the 1980s but by then we had 
discovered cyberspace which was even better than virtual Dodge City 
or The Final Frontier somewhere west of the Cosmos.  
Ashdown, supra note 1. See also Morriss, supra note 1; Barlow, Jack In, supra note 1. 
 51. See Kapor & Barlow, supra note 1, ¶ 6 (claiming that sovereignty over cyber-
space is not well defined). See also supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text (describing 
the absence of the state from Turner’s West). 
 52. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Vindication and Resistance: A Response to 
the Carnegie Mellon Study of Pornography in Cyberspace, 83 GEO. L.J. 1959 (1995) 
(noting free availability of pornography in cyberspace and arguing that such availability 
harms women); Dianne Plunkett Latham, Spam Remedies, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
1649 (2001) (describing undesired mass e-mails called “spam” and advocating legislation 
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place to negotiate. Only computer-savvy settlers really know how to sur-
vive there.53 At the same time, cyberspace contains abundant free land that 
bestows huge fortunes and social opportunities to those sufficiently brave 
and industrious to venture into its virtual wilderness.54 Founders of new 
“dot-coms,” venture capitalists, and even ordinary investors participate in 
an Internet gold rush that has gone through a cycle of boom and bust.55 
Others risk being stalked in order find love and friendship.56 For them, the 
                                                                                                                         
to restrict its use); Scot M. Graydon, Much Ado About Spam: Unsolicited Advertising, 
The Internet, and You, 32 ST. MARY’S L.J. 77 (2000) (same); Kurt M. Saunders & Bruce 
Zucker, Counteracting Identity Fraud in the Information Age: The Identity Theft and As-
sumption Deterrence Act, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 661 (1999) (exploring the prob-
lem of identity theft and the effect of legislation designed to combat the problem); Alfred 
C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright Infringement, En-
terprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833, 1834-35 (2000) (describ-
ing concern about copyright infringement on the Internet); Keller, supra note 2 (discuss-
ing gambling in cyberspace); Mary M. Calkins, They Shoot Trojan Horses, Don’t They? 
An Economic Analysis of Anti-Hacking Regulatory Models, 89 GEO. L.J. 171 (2000) (de-
scribing and analyzing the problem of “hacking” as the unauthorized access of a com-
puter). 
 53. In 1990, Mitch Kapor and John Perry Barlow, co-founders of the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, wrote: 
In its present condition, Cyberspace is a frontier region, populated by 
the few hardy technologists who can tolerate the austerity of its savage 
computer interfaces, incompatible communications protocols, proprie-
tary barricades, cultural and legal ambiguities, and general lack of use-
ful maps or metaphors. 
Kapor & Barlow, supra note 1, ¶ 4. See also TURNER, FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY, 
supra note 27 (describing how settlers were forced to adapt to the harsh conditions of the 
West). 
 54. See Fitzgibbons, supra note 1, at *2 (characterizing cyberspace as a “land of 
opportunity”); Lastowka, supra note 2, at 855 (“Like the Old West, the Web combines a 
promise of territorial expansion and ‘gold in the hills’ with legends of a self-reliant and 
independent citizenry.”). 
 55. See Janet Rae-Dupree, Executives Rush the Net: Top Managers Give Up the 
Corner Office to Seek Their Fortunes in the Wild Web, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 
23, 1996, at 1E (reporting that executives are leaving traditional jobs for the Internet gold 
rush); Mike Allen, Internet Prospectors Pan for Business Opportunities, SAN DIEGO BUS. 
J., Dec. 6, 1999, at 17 (reporting comparison of frenzied purchase of Internet company 
stock to a gold rush); David Leonhardt, M.B.A. Boom Fades as Candidates Seek Instead 
the Rewards of the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1999, §1 (Business/Financial Desk), at 
40 (reporting on potential MBA students' “gold-rush mentality” about the Internet as seen 
by the Dean of the Dartmouth Tuck Business School). See also TURNER, Problems of the 
West, supra note 25, at 212 (characterizing the West as “another name for opportunity” 
with abundant resources—including mines—available to “the shrewdest and boldest”). 
 56. See Amy C. Radosevich, Thwarting the Stalker: Are Anti-Stalking Measures 
Keeping Pace with Today’s Stalker?, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1371 (describing use of the 
Internet to stalk victims); RHEINGOLD, supra note 18, at 17-27 (discussing formation of 
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very technology that distributes pornography, pirated software, and junk e-
mail also unites them with others previously separated by physical geog-
raphy. They are pioneers who found diverse new communities in the wil-
derness of cyberspace.57 Modern individuals who follow these Internet 
pioneers by logging on to the Internet therefore participate in the creation 
of a more prosperous and better society.  
C. The Western Frontier Metaphor and Legal Regulation of the 
Internet 
The Western Frontier metaphor provides an inspiring account of the 
Internet, but this account does not offer neutral truth beyond debate. In-
stead, the Western Frontier metaphor operates as propaganda supporting 
minimal regulation of the Internet. This becomes clear upon a brief review 
of arguments for and against such minimal regulation. 
At one end of the debate, some of those favoring minimal regulation58 
take the idea of cyberspace as a separate place so seriously that traditional 
government cannot effectively intrude.59 For them, the absence of conven-
tional geographical borders in cyberspace removes territory as a justifica-
                                                                                                                         
community and friends on the Internet). See also SHERRY TURKLE, LIFE ON THE SCREEN: 
IDENTITY IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET (1995). 
 57. See John Markoff, Staking a Claim on The Virtual Frontier, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 
1994, § 4 (Week in Review Desk), at 5 (referring to “hardy bands of pioneers who staked 
out the first electronic communities”); Richard Sullivan, All Fangled up in the Internet, 
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 11, 1994, at 11C (describing Internet pioneers who have 
already founded “frontier communities”). See also TURNER, Contributions of the West, 
supra note 26, at 259 (referring to the founding of “free cities and free States” in the 
West). 
 58. For examples of arguments favoring this position, see David R. Johnson & 
David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 
(1996) [hereinafter Johnson & Post, Law and Borders]; David G. Post & David R. John-
son, “Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent”: Towards A New Theory of Decentralized 
Decision-Making in Complex Systems, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055 (1998) [hereinafter 
Post & Johnson, Chaos Prevailing]; David G. Post, What Larry Doesn’t Get: Code, Law 
and Liberty in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1439 (2000); Gibbons, supra note 1; Dawn 
C. Nunziato, Exit, Voice, and Values on the Net, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 753 (2000) 
(reviewing LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999)); Ship-
chandler, supra note 1. The most colorful statement of the libertarian position is John 
Perry Barlow’s Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, supra note 7. See also 
BIEGEL, supra note 1, at 124 (“Commentators and in fact many companies continue to 
argue that self-regulation remains the most appropriate strategy . . .”). 
 59. See Johnson & Post, Law and Borders, supra note 58, at 1379 (“Treating Cyber-
space as a separate ‘space’ to which distinct laws apply should come naturally.”); Gib-
bons, supra note 1, at 477 (“Cyberspace is a community of 71 million individuals which 
has so far relied on a distinct culture of shared norms and common values to control their 
behavior.”). 
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tion for sovereign jurisdiction.60 Attempts by sovereign states to regulate 
the Internet must fail because the Internet’s decentralized operation makes 
it impossible for any single state to control activity in cyberspace. This 
makes private ordering in cyberspace inevitable.61  
More importantly, even if sovereign control of cyberspace could be es-
tablished legally and practically, any such regime would be less desirable 
than private ordering because the Internet’s inherent characteristics obvi-
ate the need for state regulation. In real space, state regulation is necessary 
because the physical limitations of real space force people to deal with 
those whom they would rather avoid. One cannot always choose or avoid 
one’s neighbors, and sometimes it is just too much trouble to shop at a 
store distant from one’s home, even if the distant store offers better prices 
and service. These circumstances sometimes give rise to disputes that 
could, in theory, be resolved privately. However, experience has shown 
that state intervention is appropriate and helpful because state power 
forces individuals to stop antisocial behavior that others cannot avoid.62  
Cyberspace, however, does not suffer from the physical problems of 
real space. Individuals in cyberspace can visit an infinite number of people 
and places because everyone is simply a few mouse clicks away. Thus, 
state intervention is not required in cyberspace because the natural charac-
teristics of cyberspace allow individuals to avoid or discipline undesirable 
behavior more effectively than they can in real space. Bothersome people 
create less trouble in cyberspace because it is easier to avoid particular 
web sites than malodorous litter on the lawn at next door. No Internet 
business can treat its customers poorly because cyberspace makes it easy 
for them to escape. A few clicks of the mouse allow them to leave for a 
different business that offers better treatment.63 Individuals will discipline 
those who behave inappropriately by moving, or threatening to move, 
within this virtual frontier, over time leading to an Internet free of undesir-
able behavior. In the strong version of this argument, this pattern of behav-
ior creates a form of political utopia where all government takes place by 
                                                                                                                         
 60. See Johnson & Post, Law and Borders, supra note 58, at 1370-78. 
 61. See id. at 1372-73 (describing how sovereign attempts to regulate the Internet 
will fail); Gibbons, supra note 1, at 509 (“[T]he infrastructure of cyberspace is evolving 
too rapidly for governments to regulate efficiently.”). 
 62. Cf. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA ix (1974) (“Our main con-
clusions about the state are that a minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protec-
tion against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified . . .”). 
 63. See Johnson & Post, Law and Borders, supra note 58, at 1398 (discussing ease 
of exit in cyberspace). See also Nunziato, supra note 58. For an interesting analysis of the 
Internet’s facilitation of exit and its effect on the global economy, see Dan L. Burk, Vir-
tual Exit in the Global Information Economy, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 943 (1998). 
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the explicit consent of the governed because all Internet users will be able 
to associate with privately created Internet sites that embody their pre-
ferred political values.64  
On the other hand, those who favor more robust legal regulation of the 
Internet65 do not trust the “natural” characteristics of cyberspace to obviate 
the need for traditional government. They worry that an unregulated Inter-
net could lead to the excessive concentration of power in private hands 
because the absence of regulation implies no restraint on the use of tech-
nology by the powerful for private advantage.66 They recognize the argu-
ment that the nature of cyberspace guarantees easy escape from oppres-
sion, but they doubt that the Internet works as advertised.67 Accordingly, 
they believe that the state appropriately intervenes to guide the Internet’s 
development.68 
A significant point of disagreement between the two sides of the de-
bate is the claim that the “natural” characteristics of cyberspace blunt the 
dangers that could follow from the unregulated use of technology by pow-
erful private parties. Awareness of this disagreement exposes the ideologi-
cal operation of the Western Frontier metaphor. According to Turner, the 
Western Frontier ensured American freedom and prosperity precisely be-
cause resources were abundant and the state was absent.69 The Western 
Frontier metaphor constructs the Internet the same way. The minimally 
regulated Internet offers freedom and prosperity because cyberspace has a 
                                                                                                                         
 64. See Johnson & Post, Law and Borders, supra note 58, at 1398 (discussing how 
ease of movement in cyberspace leads to government by true consent). 
 65. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999); AN-
DREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: HOW THE INTERNET IS PUTTING PEOPLE 
IN CHARGE AND CHANGING THE WORLD WE KNOW (1999); James Boyle, Foucault in 
Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty and Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177 
(1997); Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of 
“Rights Management”, 97 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1998) (arguing against a laissez-faire pol-
icy towards the private contractual delineation of intellectual property rights); Jerry Kang, 
Cyber-Race, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1130 (2000); Keller, supra note 2 (advocating regulation 
of online gambling); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical 
View from Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 395 (2000); Paul M. Schwartz, 
Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1607 (1999) (advocating rules 
concerning privacy on the Internet). 
 66. See SHAPIRO, supra note 65, at 25-52; Boyle, supra note 65, at 196-201 (de-
scribing use of the Internet for surveillance and control); Schwartz, supra note 65, at 
1620-40 (describing use of technology to gather personal information). 
 67. See Netanel, supra note 65, at 410-52;  
 68. See LESSIG, supra note 65, at 210-34; Netanel, supra note 65. 
 69. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text. 
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lot of “land” and very few state-imposed laws.70 In Turner’s romanticized 
West, people who faced oppression could easily find freedom by moving 
further west. That freedom allowed self-sufficient individuals to succeed 
precisely because the absence of the state allowed them to create better 
lives and civic institutions on their own.71 Internet users who feel op-
pressed can do the same thing by clicking a mouse.72 In fact, an Internet 
user can find a place of his own more easily than a Western pioneer could 
because there are no physical distances to cross in cyberspace. Cyberspace 
is therefore an improved version of the American West where the state can 
only inhibit self-sufficient individuals from ensuring their own freedom 
and prosperity. Accordingly, it would be wise to apply minimal regulation 
to the Internet.73 Granted, this perspective would not necessarily rule out 
                                                                                                                         
 70. See Johnson & Post, Law and Borders, supra note 58, at 1395-96 (noting that it 
is easy for Internet users to create new “territory” in cyberspace by setting up new discus-
sion groups); Morriss, supra note 1. 
 71. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. 
 72. See Nunziato, supra note 58, at 753-54. 
 73. For laissez-faire arguments that draw support from the Western frontier, see 
Morriss, supra note 1 (arguing that the West provided opportunities because the govern-
ment left it generally unregulated, and advocating a similar policy for the Internet); Post, 
supra note 6, at 543 (claiming that the settlement of the New World led to a rethinking of 
sovereign power and arguing that cyberspace will have the same effect); Shipchandler, 
supra note 1 (comparing the Internet to the “Wild West” and using the comparison to 
argue against regulation of the Internet). 
  It is worth noting that many of these arguments also draw support from modern 
confidence in unregulated markets. Modern welfare economics operates on the premise 
that unregulated behavior under “perfect market conditions” automatically leads to a so-
cially optimal allocation of resources. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 38 (2d ed. 1997) (describing how general equilibrium under perfect condi-
tions is socially optimal); HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 46 (4th ed. 1995) (“[A] 
competitive economy ‘automatically’ allocates resources efficiently, without any need for 
centralized direction . . .”). Perfect market conditions include the absence of transaction 
costs, the complete absence of monopoly, costless access to all relevant information, and 
the complete internalization of costs and benefits. COOTER & ULEN, supra, at 38-41 
(identifying sources of market failure); ROSEN, supra, at 52-54. Unfortunately, perfect 
market conditions never exist. See ROSEN, supra, at 54. Government must therefore occa-
sionally intervene in otherwise unregulated markets to correct problems raised by market 
imperfections, but only when the relevant imperfections are serious enough to block 
transactions that would otherwise have occurred under perfect conditions. See COOTER & 
ULEN, supra, at 79-93 (describing how government can lower transaction costs); Guido 
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: 
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (analyzing the use of property 
and liability rules in light of market imperfections); Alfred C. Yen, A Preliminary Eco-
nomic Analysis of Napster: Internet Technology, Copyright Liability, and the Possibility 
of Coasean Bargaining, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 247, 258-60 (2001) (explaining market 
imperfection and occasional need for government intervention). Our society demonstrates 
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all Internet regulation, but it does create a basic presumption against regu-
lation beyond the recognition of basic property rights and the enforcement 
of contract.74  
D. Evaluating the Western Frontier Metaphor 
An evaluation of the Western Frontier metaphor begins by recognizing 
how its influence pushes other perspectives from view. The value of this 
influence depends on whether the metaphor's lessons are well-considered. 
                                                                                                                         
its faith in unregulated markets by making the assumption that most market imperfections 
are not serious enough to warrant government intervention. We therefore leave most 
transactions unregulated despite the acknowledged existence of market imperfections. 
  It is possible to argue that the Internet brings society closer to perfect market 
conditions, and that government regulation of Internet is therefore relatively unnecessary. 
See Gibbons, supra note 1, at 529-30 (claiming that Internet technology reduces transac-
tion costs); Post & Johnson, Chaos Prevailing, supra note 58, at 1087-89 (arguing that 
low transaction costs of exit on the Internet increase the likelihood that low levels of gov-
ernment regulation will increase social welfare). While the Internet may improve mar-
kets, the Internet surely does not perfect them. Even if the Internet significantly lowers 
certain transaction costs, it still does not eliminate barriers to entry, ensure complete ac-
cess to relevant information, internalize all externalities, or eliminate monopolies. Ac-
cordingly, economics can be used to support the libertarian position on Internet regula-
tion, but the issue is far from settled. See Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics of 
Internet Norms, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1257 (1998) (providing a skeptical analysis of the 
claim that private ordering on the Internet will be efficient). 
 74. Indeed, Turner himself recognized the role of law in realizing the promise of the 
West. For example, the Homestead Act made western migration possible for many who 
otherwise would not have made the trip by guaranteeing settlers legal title to land they 
occupied. See FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, Pioneer Ideals and the State University, 
Commencement Address at the University of Indiana (1910), in TURNER, FRONTIER IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 276. However, he also believed that Americans influenced by the 
frontier could tolerate legal regulation only in limited amounts: 
In brief, the defenses of the pioneer democrat began to shift from free 
land to legislation, from the ideal of individualism to the ideal of social 
control through regulation by law. He had no sympathy with a radical 
reconstruction of society by the revolution of socialism; even his alli-
ances with the movement of organized labor, which paralleled that of 
organized capital in the East, were only half-hearted. 
Id. at 277. He also wrote: 
Legislation is taking the place of the free lands as the means of preserv-
ing the ideal of democracy. But at the same time it is endangering the 
other pioneer ideal of creative and competitive individualism. Both 
were essential and constituted what was best in America’s contribution 
to history and to progress. Both must be preserved if the nation would 
be true to its past, and would fulfil[l] its highest destiny. 
Frederick Jackson Turner, The West and American Ideals, Commencement Address, 
University of Washington (June 17, 1914), in Wash. Hist. Q., Oct. 1914, reprinted in 
Turner, The Frontier in American History 307. 
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If the metaphor rests on a reasonable account of history, its lessons gain 
credibility because that account offers a real example of how abundant 
land and the state’s absence once led to the success of self-reliant indi-
viduals and the creation of a better society. It is at least plausible to claim 
that history will repeat itself in cyberspace. However, if the metaphor’s 
account of history is inaccurate, then the metaphor misleads because it 
forecasts a quasi-utopian future in cyberspace on the basis of a history that 
never existed. The claim that the Internet’s abundant “land” and minimal 
regulation will lead to a better society becomes a theory without historical 
antecedent. Indeed, there would be reason to believe that the Western 
Frontier metaphor hides a more accurate and complicated history of the 
West that society might not want to repeat in cyberspace. Society could 
then find itself unhappy with policies that are heavily influenced by the 
existing Western Frontier metaphor. 
It is therefore instructive to note that the Western Frontier metaphor’s 
history is, at best, incomplete. As stories like Shane make clear, the oper-
ating image of the Western Frontier metaphor is a one where the virtuous 
prevail and evil is wiped out. Unfortunately, the West was not such place. 
Genocide, racism, and personal exploitation in the name of progress com-
prise a significant portion of Western Frontier history, but popular culture 
has cemented a romanticized version of the West that ignores or discounts 
this reality.75  
This makes the Western Frontier metaphor problematic because it en-
courages ignorance of the very real possibility that the Internet will foster 
undesirable social developments. Internalization of the Western Frontier 
metaphor creates the belief that minimal legal regulation “naturally” 
works well for the Internet, when effective legal regulation might have 
prevented the myriad social problems of the actual Western Frontier.76 
                                                                                                                         
 75. See supra Part III.A.  
 76. The problem identified here is similar to the one analyzed by Professor Julie 
Cohen in her article Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights 
Management”, supra note 65. In that article, Professor Cohen describes how “cybere-
conomists” have accepted as true a number of questionable premises about the economic 
efficiency of unregulated contracting and heavily defended property rights. Professor 
Cohen criticizes these premises as unconvincing, and describes how they function as 
“just-so stories” that make certain highly contestable policy choices—particularly a lais-
sez-faire attitude towards the private delineation of intellectual property rights—seem 
natural and inevitable. See id. at 463-66.  
  The point being made by this Article is that our cultural acceptance of Turner’s 
romanticized frontier thesis and its application to the Internet function the same way. We 
come to believe that the West really was the place where laissez-faire policies created a 
free and prosperous society when the truth of that claim is highly contestable. Once we 
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This suggests that the Western Frontier metaphor could be improved by 
revising its history. If society’s collective imagination could embrace the 
tragedies of the West as completely as its successes, the Western Frontier 
metaphor might give a fairly robust account of the potentials and pitfalls 
of cyberspace. However, these efforts alone will probably not be enough 
to correct the Western Frontier metaphor’s misleading tug on Internet pol-
icy. 
This difficulty arises because, as noted earlier, the history of the West-
ern Frontier metaphor represents a fusion of popular culture and academic 
thought. Although academic criticism has already blunted the force of 
Turner’s thesis among professional historians,77 Turner’s rosy perspective 
persists in popular culture because popular culture does not pay attention 
to the criticism. Unlike serious historians, moviemakers can ignore the ac-
cusation that their movies do not accurately depict the West. They can 
claim, appropriately, that movies are fictional entertainment, and their 
success is measured not by fidelity to historical fact but instead by their 
popularity with audiences. They cannot help it if audiences prefer optimis-
tic depictions of the West, nor can they be held responsible if audiences 
internalize fictional portrayals of the West as true.78 
Perhaps more importantly, there is real doubt about whether people—
particularly Americans—could successfully accept a chastened view of the 
Western Frontier even if popular culture began broadcasting one.79 
Turner’s frontier thesis swept the country in part because it offered an up-
lifting story that explained the existence and triumph of distinctly Ameri-
can virtues. That story has now become part and parcel of an American 
history that generally minimizes America’s less admirable moments. It is, 
in fact, a central component of how Americans construct and identify 
themselves. A chastened view of the Western Frontier will always face 
                                                                                                                         
believe this, we are well down the road to constructing the Internet in the image of the 
romanticized West and applying laissez-faire regulatory policies to it. 
 77. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. 
 78. Indeed, a moviemaker might claim that the primary consideration in producing 
any movie is economic profit, or ticket sales. People see movies to be entertained and feel 
good, so dark portrayals of the West would be financially risky. The possibility that we 
have literally been sold our rosy view of the West is a fascinating one that is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
 79. Two movies that broadcast such a view were Dances with Wolves (Orion Pic-
tures 1990), starring Kevin Costner, and Little Big Man (Paramount Pictures 1970), star-
ring Dustin Hoffman. Despite their popularity and critical acclaim, neither movie has 
significantly changed the standard popular culture view of America’s Western frontier.  
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marginalization because its acceptance would challenge the very essence 
of American identity.80  
The difficulties of reforming the Western Frontier metaphor suggest 
that the metaphor itself needs to be dislodged from its prominence. Con-
tinued application of the unreformed metaphor creates an incomplete and 
misleading influence on policy and crowds out other metaphors that offer 
alternate perspectives on the Internet. Minimal regulation of the Internet 
might then pass from one of many possible strategies to an unquestionable 
“truth” protected by an unchallenged Western Frontier ideology. We must 
therefore begin imagining the Internet from new perspectives that chal-
lenge the Western Frontier metaphor, and it is to this task that this Article 
now turns by offering feudal society as a metaphor for the Internet 
IV. CYBERSPACE AND FEUDAL SOCIETY 
A. Feudal Society 
In Europe, feudalism81 was a method of political and social organiza-
tion that emerged from the natural and social conditions that prevailed 
during ninth and tenth century.82 Constant invasion and local feuds had 
                                                                                                                         
 80. Historian Donald Worster has captured well the difficulties Americans have 
when contemplating the Western frontier: 
Say the word “West” and, immediately, vistas of mustangs galloping 
across wide-open spaces under immense, unclouded skies fill our 
imaginations, and sober reason has to come panting after. Say the word 
and we are off living in a dream, experiencing its old powerful emo-
tions but as ever finding it difficult to say how the dream ends. As a 
people, we are quick to invent fantasies but slower to find plausible, re-
alistic endings for them. 
WORSTER, supra note 46, at 79. 
 81. Any definition of feudalism has its shortcomings. First, no two societies prac-
ticed feudalism in exactly the same way. Second, feudalism evolved over its three centu-
ries as the dominant form of political and social organization in Europe. Accordingly, 
historians have found it difficult to agree on a precise definition of feudalism. See Eliza-
beth Brown, The Tyranny of a Construct: Feudalism and Historians of Medieval Europe, 
79 AM. HIST. REV. 1063 (1974). Nevertheless, it is possible to give a general account of 
feudal societies and some of their most important characteristics. 
 82. For descriptions and analyses of feudalism, see MARC BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY 
(L. A. Manyon trans., 1961); JOSEPH R. STRAYER, FEUDALISM (1965); F. L. GANSHOF, 
FEUDALISM (Philip Grierson trans., 3rd Eng. ed. 1964); WALTER PHELPS HALL & 
ROBERT GREENHALGH ALBION, A HISTORY OF ENGLAND AND THE BRITISH EMPIRE (3d 
ed. 1953); DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HERITAGE (1999); 
JOHN M. W. BEAN, THE DECLINE OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM 1215-1540 (1968); Richard J. 
Lazarus, Debunking Environmental Feudalism: Promoting the Individual through the 
Collective Pursuit of Environmental Quality, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1739 (1992). 
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created social chaos that exacted a great toll on both the land and the 
population.83 While order had to be restored, an individual monarch could 
not, as a practical matter, control large tracts of land by himself. Mon-
archs, therefore, had to find a way to delegate military and political re-
sponsibility to individuals who would remain loyal. Feudalism helped ac-
complish this. 
The feudal state sprouted from a series of agreements between a king 
and his followers. The king, who claimed all of the country’s land for 
himself, divided his land into parcels known as “fiefs” and granted them to 
his most loyal followers. In return, these “tenants-in-chief”84 swore their 
loyalty to the king and promised to provide military service, money, 
prayer, or civil service.85 The king and each tenant-in-chief formalized 
their roles as “lord” and “vassal” in a ceremony of homage, during which 
the lord would accept the vassal’s pledge of fealty.86 Vassals who pos-
sessed fiefs could in turn subdivide their lands and become lords to vassals 
of their own. This process often continued through multiple layers of 
“mesne lords” who simultaneously acted as vassals to their superiors and 
lords to their inferiors.87 Over time, this hierarchical pattern of grants be-
came sufficiently complex to permit some vassals to swear allegiance to 
more than one lord at a time, although theoretically each vassal had sworn 
supreme allegiance to one lord over the others.88 
Feudalism worked by allowing kings to capitalize on the abundance of 
land, which was important to the creation of wealth in medieval times.89 
Kings who granted fiefs did more than make their followers rich. They 
                                                                                                                         
 83. See BLOCH, supra note 82, at 3-39; GANSHOF, supra note 82, at 3-4. 
 84. HALL & ALBION, supra note 82, at 66 (describing those who held fiefs directly 
from the king as “tenants-in-chief”); COQUILLETTE, supra note 82, at 96 (same). 
 85. HALL & ALBION, supra note 82, at 65-68 (describing the Norman-French prac-
tice of feudalism); COQUILLETTE, supra note 82, at 95-97 (describing imposition of feu-
dalism by William the Conqueror). The original obligation of service was military, but 
the practice of military service gradually deteriorated in favor of money because a lord’s 
vassal would not necessarily be the best available warrior. Money payments were there-
fore preferred because they allowed the lord to establish his own private force of effective 
mercenaries. See STRAYER, supra note 82, at 51-53. 
 86. See GANSHOF, supra note 82, at 69-106 (describing various forms of vassalage, 
homage, and fealty); HALL & ALBION, supra note 82, at 66-67 (describing homage and 
fealty).  
 87. COQUILLETTE, supra note 82, at 97; HALL & ALBION, supra note 82, at 65-66. 
 88. See BLOCH, supra note 82, at 211-28 (discussing multiple vassalage); HALL & 
ALBION, supra note 82, at 66-67 (noting that vassals might hold land from more than one 
lord). 
 89. See HALL & ALBION, supra note 82, at 65 (referring to plentiful land held by 
European rulers). 
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also ensured the loyalty of those to whom the king delegated the tasks of 
administering and defending the land. Possession of a fief entitled its 
holder to both occupy and exploit the land. Because their homes and pros-
perity depended on it, lords at every level of the system would administer 
and defend their lands to the best of their abilities. This close connection 
between an individual’s private interest and his public responsibilities 
gave feudalism two of its most distinctive characteristics: the treatment of 
political authority as an incident of private property and the fragmentation 
of government. 
First, the simultaneous transfer of private interests in land and political 
authority meant that private individuals often exercised significant 
amounts of state power as an incident of private property. Initially, lords 
did not always grant judicial, police and regulatory powers over fiefs and 
their inhabitants to vassals.90 Over time, however, such delegation became 
common as a matter of practical necessity.91 Individuals accumulated 
power as a result of their land holdings, and not as the result of appoint-
ment to public office. Even in those cases where the right to administer 
state functions remained separate from possession of a fief, lords often 
granted those powers to other followers, thereby increasing the treatment 
of state power as a private possession.92 
Second, the subdivision and transfer of fiefs to inferior vassals led to 
the fragmentation of government. The association of land with the right 
and authority to govern meant that lords gave away some of their power 
whenever they granted land to their vassals. Over time, this practice took 
significant power from the king and his tenants-in-chief and vested it in 
local lords who often administered justice over their subjects with relative 
impunity.93 
                                                                                                                         
 90. See GANSHOF, supra note 82, at 156-67 (discussing varying degrees of unity 
between the granting of fiefs and the granting of political authority, police powers, and 
regulatory functions).  
 91. STRAYER, supra note 82, at 36-42. 
 92. See GANSHOF, supra note 82, at 157. 
 93. See STRAYER, supra note 82, at 36-42 (describing fragmentation of government 
in feudal Europe and the practical independence of powerful lords); BLOCH, supra note 
82, at 446 (listing fragmentation of authority as a key characteristic of European feudal 
society); GANSHOF, supra note 82, at xv (noting that feudalism was marked by “a disper-
sal of political authority amongst a hierarchy of persons who exercise in their own inter-
est powers normally attributed to the state and which are often, in fact, derived from its 
break-up”). 
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While the above-described division of land and political authority pro-
vided the backbone of feudalism,94 it was not the only way in which land 
was allocated and exploited because the roles of lord and vassal existed 
only among those who occupied feudal society’s higher circles.95 In order 
to recruit and maintain sources of labor necessary to make land produc-
tive, those holding fiefs relied on the manorial system.96 The foundation 
for the manorial system was the economic relationship between fief hold-
ers as “lords of the manor” and the peasants or “serfs” who lived on the 
lord’s land. The relationship between lord and serf superficially resembled 
the one between lord and vassal. Like vassals, serfs received interests in 
land in exchange for service. However, the nature of the interest and ser-
vice differed significantly from that of a vassal. A vassal held his fief as 
part of a relationship in which the king took an interest, while a serf held 
his interest as part of a relationship governed by the “custom of the 
manor.”97 Additionally, a vassal owed his lord only specified services, 
while a serf frequently owed his lord open-ended services.98 
The intensely local nature of the relationship between serf and lord 
meant that the lord could and did exploit the serf for the lord’s profit. Ser-
vice to the lord meant that a serf spent most of his time tilling the lord’s 
fields. Even when the serf found time to work his own land, the lord still 
took a portion of the serf’s production and forced the serf to pay fees for 
mandatory use of the lord’s mill, oven, and other facilities.99 Moreover, 
                                                                                                                         
 94. See JOSEPH R. STRAYER, MEDIEVAL STATECRAFT AND THE PERSPECTIVES OF 
HISTORY 63 (1971) (“Feudalism was a type of government in which political power was 
treated as a private possession and was divided among a large number of lords.”). 
 95. HALL & ALBION, supra note 82, at 66 (“The donor of the fief was always the 
lord, and the recipient the vassal; but every man involved in this relationship belonged to 
the upper classes.”); BLOCH, supra note 82, at 241 (describing relations of dependence 
other than vassalage existing in lower portions of feudal society); COQUILLETTE, supra 
note 82, at 98 (distinguishing free and unfree tenure). 
 96. See BLOCH, supra note 82, at 241 (describing the manorial system as the domi-
nant form of social organization for lower classes in feudal society and the importance of 
the manorial system in generating wealth for lords); HALL & ALBION, supra note 82, at 
69-70 (describing importance of the manorial system in generating wealth for upper 
classes of feudal society). 
 97. See BLOCH, supra note 82, at 248 (“[T]he relations of the lord with the tenants 
were regulated only by ‘the custom of the manor.’”); COQUILLETTE, supra note 82, at 98 
(describing how the “unfree tenure” of serfs was protected only by the Lord of the 
Manor).  
 98. See COQUILLETTE, supra note 82, at 98 (describing how English serfs held land 
in return for “uncertain services”). 
 99. See HALL & ALBION, supra note 82, at 70-71 (describing the exploitation of 
serfs); BLOCH, supra note 82, at 251 (describing the lord’s monopolies); COQUILLETTE, 
supra note 82, at 98 (describing the exploitation of serfs). 
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serfs were “tied to the soil” and became the subjects of new lords if and 
when the manor changed hands.100 This exploitation had limits, however. 
Abused serfs could and did escape to neighboring manors whose lords of-
fered better treatment.101 Even so, the life of a serf was one of exploitation 
and subjugation. Feudal society was clearly divided between its haves and 
have-nots.102 
B. Internet Governance 
The development of the Feudal Society metaphor also requires a de-
scription of the Internet’s governance. It is fashionable to say that no sin-
gle entity could or should govern cyberspace because the Internet is too 
vast to submit to central authority. However, this statement is an exaggera-
tion. While the Internet does have many users whose number and diversity 
sometimes render central control impracticable, some central coordination 
must exist so that computers attached to the Internet can share a common 
communications protocol.103 The Internet therefore has always required a 
person, entity, or group to make decisions about basic technology that all 
computers on the network must use. The first such decision-makers were 
the scientists and engineers who developed the Internet on behalf of the 
United States government.104 Over time, two private, nonprofit entities 
have taken over significant portions of this task and now provide limited 
oversight of Internet operations. 
The first of these entities is the Internet Society (“ISOC”), a profes-
sional membership society whose members come from over 150 coun-
                                                                                                                         
 100. See HALL & ALBION, supra note 82, at 69 (noting that serfs were “tied to the 
soil.”). 
 101. As Marc Bloch wrote: 
Of course the lords sought to retain their peasants. What was the estate 
worth without labour to work it? But it was difficult to prevent deser-
tions because, on the one hand, the fragmentation of authority was 
more than ever inimical to any effective police control and, on the 
other, the great abundance of virgin soil made it useless to threaten with 
confiscation a fugitive who was almost always certain of finding a new 
place for himself elsewhere. 
BLOCH, supra note 82, at 263. See also COQUILLETTE, supra note 82, at 98 (“‘Good’ 
lords kept their serfs, while cruel lords saw their serfs ‘disappear’ to the lands of better 
masters, who would carefully fail to report their presence.”).  
 102. See HALL & ALBION, supra note 82, at 69 (“The manorial relation, unlike the 
mutually advantageous political feudal relationship, was most unequal; for it gave almost 
everything to the lord and almost nothing to the peasant.”). 
 103. See GRALLA, supra note 15, at 2, 13 (describing how computers connected to 
the Internet communicate using the TCP/IP protocol suite). 
 104. See LEINER, ET AL., supra note 10. 
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tries.105 Today, the Internet Architecture Board (“IAB”), an advisory 
committee within ISOC, makes decisions about the standard technical ar-
chitecture deployed on the Internet.106 Although no sovereign’s law man-
dates compliance with IAB standards, it would be impractical to connect a 
computer to the Internet without such compliance. The IAB’s standards 
presently require implementation of a data communication protocol suite 
called TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol).107 Any 
person can therefore—at least in theory—connect her computer to the 
Internet as long as that computer implements TCP/IP.108 
The second of these entities is The Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (“ICANN”), a nonprofit corporation recognized by a 
number of governments to administer the so-called Domain Name System 
(“DNS”).109 ICANN oversees the process and systems ensuring that each 
domain name maps to the correct IP address.110 Information sent across 
the Internet finds its way to the proper computer because the receiving 
computer’s IP address tells other computers where data packets should be 
sent.111 In theory, Internet users could rely solely on numerical IP ad-
dresses to send e-mail and view web sites. However, the bland characteris-
tics of numerical strings make them hard to remember. Using the TCP/IP 
protocol suite with the DNS solves this problem by allowing users to iden-
tify specific computers with ordinary words. ICANN administers and co-
ordinates the DNS112 by, among other things, maintaining servers that 
match domain names to fixed IP addresses,113 accrediting domain name 
                                                                                                                         
 105. See id. 
 106. See Internet Architectural Board, IAB Overview, available at http://www.iab. 
org/overview.html (last modified Nov. 3, 2000). 
 107. See GRALLA, supra note 15, at 13. 
 108. Similar decisions concerning the Internet application known as the World Wide 
Web are made by the World Wide Web Consortium ("W3C"), an organization comprised 
of 500 member organizations from around the world. See W3C, About the World Wide 
Web Consortium, available at http://www.w3.org/Consortium (last modified Nov. 16, 
2002). The close relationship between the Internet and the World Wide Web means that 
those connecting to the Internet will likely also comply with technological specifications 
necessary to use the World Wide Web.  
 109. See ICANN, ICANN Fact Sheet, available at http://www.icann.org/general/fact-
sheet.htm (last updated Feb. 17, 2001). 
 110. See InterNIC, The Domain Name System: A Nontechnical Explanation—Why 
Universal Resolvability Is Important, available at http://www.internic.net/faqs/-
authoritative-dns.html (last updated Oct. 5, 2002) (discussing how IP addresses work 
with DNS). 
 111. Id. 
 112. See id. (describing the DNS and ICANN’s administration of the DNS). 
 113. See ICANN, ICANN Fact Sheet, supra note 109 (setting forth ICANN’s respon-
sibilities). 
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registrars,114 and approving the establishment of new regional registries 
who distribute IP addresses.115 
The DNS operates by establishing a hierarchy of Internet domains. 
The Top Level Domains (“TLDs”) include the familiar .com, .edu, .org, 
.net, and .gov, as well as newly created ones like .biz and .info.116 Various 
entities (generally private corporations) operate each of these domains by 
keeping a list that matches every domain name within the domain to its 
corresponding IP address. For example, VeriSign Global Registry Services 
currently manages the .com domain.117 VeriSign owns and operates the 
computer that authoritatively matches the IP address corresponding to 
aol.com, the domain associated with America Online. Thus, when a user 
enters aol.com into her web browser, her computer sends a request to the 
computer operated by VeriSign for the IP address associated with 
aol.com.118 The VeriSign computer responds with the IP address, enabling 
the user’s computer to communicate directly with the computer operated 
by America Online. 
The TLDs occupy the uppermost level of the domain name hierarchy. 
Each TLD sits over other domains that govern domain names and IP ad-
dresses of their own. For example, a user accessing the University of Ari-
zona James E. Rogers College of Law types “law.arizona.edu.” This sends 
a request to Network Solutions, Inc., the operator of the TLD “.edu,” 
which sits over the domain “arizona.edu” operated by the University of 
Arizona. Network Solutions effectively refers the user to the University of 
Arizona, which in turn operates a computer that matches an IP address 
with “law.arizona.edu.” That computer will then give the IP address to the 
                                                                                                                         
 114. See ICANN, Registrar Accreditation: Overview, available at http://www.icann. 
org/registrars/accreditation.htm (last updated June 19, 2001) (describing ICANN’s ac-
creditation of domain name registrars). 
 115. See ICANN, ICP-2: Criteria for Establishment of New Regional Internet Regis-
tries, available at http://www.icann.org/icp/icp-2.htm (last updated July 7, 2001) (setting 
forth ICANN’s criteria for establishing new local Internet registries and describing their 
roles, including the allocation of IP addresses). 
 116. See Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, Generic Top-Level Domains, avail-
able at http://www.iana.org/gtld/gtld.htm (last updated Aug. 26 2002 ). 
 117. See Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, Domain Name Services, available at 
http://www.iana.org/domain-names.htm (last updated Nov. 7, 2002) (listing top level 
domains); Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, Generic Top-Level Domains, available 
at http://www.iana.org/gtld/gtld.htm (last updated Aug. 26, 2002) (listing existing and 
new top level domains and the registrars responsible for their operation). 
 118. As a technical matter, the request might also go to a different computer that sim-
ply copied information from the VeriSign computer. See InterNIC, supra note 110. 
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user, who can then communicate with the computer operated by or on be-
half of the law school.119 
The standards set up by ISOC and ICANN govern the connection of 
computers to the Internet and, by extension, the methods by which a per-
son establishes an Internet presence. A person who wants to set up an 
Internet presence needs to accomplish two things. First, she connects to 
the Internet using a computer that implements TCP/IP. If she is an ISP or 
other large user of Internet resources, she could accomplish this by provid-
ing her own high-speed lines to become part of the Internet’s backbone. If 
she desires only residential service, however, she will likely purchase the 
necessary connection from someone else and connect to the Internet near 
the bottom of its hierarchy of computers.  
Second, she obtains an IP address and has it mapped to a domain name 
that will allow Internet users to communicate with her computer. Once 
again, she can choose to enter at various points in the Internet’s hierarchy. 
If she desires her own name such as “SallyLawyer.com,” she can register 
it with VeriSign or a registrar who does business with VeriSign. If she is 
content with a lesser domain name such as “Sally-
Lawyer.LesserDomain.com,” she can register that name with the operator 
of the domain “LesserDomain.com.”120 Finally, she can simply “piggy-
back” on a computer that already has a domain name. This would result in 
a URL like “LesserDomain.com/SallyLawyer.html” or an e-mail address 
like “SallyLawyer@LesserDomain.com.”121 Although all three of these 
methods are available to anyone who wants to use them, ordinary indi-
viduals generally use the latter method through a commercial ISP, while 
businesses and large institutions more frequently use one of the former 
methods.  
C. The Feudal Character of Cyberspace 
1. The Fragmentation and Privatization of State Power 
The feudal character of cyberspace emerges from the hierarchical pri-
vatization of its government associated with the granting of Internet do-
mains. In particular, ICANN is a private entity that controls a most pre-
cious commodity—cyberspace “land” in the form of domain names.122 
                                                                                                                         
 119. See id.; GRALLA, supra note 15, at 18-19, 33. 
 120. See GRALLA, supra note 15, at 17. 
 121. See id. at 17, 169-71 (explaining e-mail addresses and URLs). 
 122. As a matter of theory, ISOC and ICANN function as technical standard setting 
bodies that merely facilitate coordination among various Internet users. This implies that 
ISOC and ICANN play only minor roles in larger questions of Internet policy. For exam-
ple, ICANN’s Fact Sheet states: 
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Like a feudal king, ICANN grants “cyberfiefs” to those who promise to 
pay money and abide by ICANN’s rules in exchange for Internet do-
mains.123 Recipients of cyberfiefs need only comply with minimal techni-
cal standards such as TCP/IP before making their cyberfiefs operational. 
ICANN distributes these cyberfiefs in a manner reminiscent of the meth-
ods used by feudal kings. As noted earlier, ICANN divides the available 
“cyberland” into TLDs such as .com, .edu, and .org. It then delegates the 
management of TLDs to TLD managers like VeriSign Global Registry 
Services. TLD managers then deal with various Internet domain name reg-
istrars, who in turn deal with general public.124 This pattern of distribution 
makes TLD managers’ status analogous to tenants-in-chief and domain 
name registrars’ status analogous to mesne lords, and it effectively creates 
a class of “cyberlords” that includes TLD managers, registrars, ISPs, busi-
nesses, and others who obtain and exploit significant interests in “cyber-
land.”  
The hierarchical distribution of cyberfiefs means that, as in feudal so-
ciety, every interest in cyberland is held from a superior computer operator 
who functions as lord over vassal or serf. This hierarchical distribution of 
cyberfiefs affects cyberspace in the same way that the granting of fiefs af-
fected medieval Europe. State power becomes an incident of private prop-
erty that gets fragmented through delegation to numerous private parties. 
This occurs because cyberlords generally delegate powers of government 
whenever they grant a cyberfief. Like feudal monarchs, they must do so 
because the Internet has become too unwieldy for any attempt to manage 
                                                                                                                         
As a technical coordinating body, ICANN’s mandate is not to “run the 
Internet.” Rather, it is to oversee the management of only those specific 
technical managerial and policy development tasks that require central 
coordination: the assignment of the Internet’s unique name and number 
identifiers. 
ICANN, ICANN Fact Sheet, supra note 109. In practice, however, the “technical” matters 
handled by ISOC and ICANN inevitably involve significant policy issues that push ISOC 
and ICANN towards the very role they disclaim. See Kesan & Shah, supra note 10, at 
169-91; Joseph P. Liu, Legitimacy and Authority in Internet Coordination: A Domain 
Name Case Study, 74 IND. L.J. 587 (1999) (demonstrating how ostensibly “technical” 
decisions about domain names actually involve value choices usually resolved by gov-
ernment institutions). 
 123. It currently costs $35 to register a domain name in the .com TLD for one year. 
See VeriSign, Domain Name Registration Page, available at http://www.netsol.com/-
en_US/name-it (last visited Nov. 16, 2002). Those who register domain names also agree 
to, among other things, ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, at 
www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm (last updated May 17, 2002) (governing disputes 
about ownership of domain names). 
 124. See supra notes 112-118 and accompanying text. 
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all aspects of its operation. New cyberlords therefore face very few restric-
tions on how they operate their computers. Cyberlords can post whatever 
content they like on their computers, permit or refuse communications 
from particular individuals and domains, limit the number of users their 
computers serve, or observe the behavior of users.125 The political nature 
of these powers becomes even clearer upon examination of the role that 
cyberlords play in the ability of individuals to enter and experience cyber-
space.  
Ordinary individuals generally get Internet access by purchasing ser-
vice from a commercial Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) or employers 
who act as ISPs. The typical ISP is a cyberlord who sells access to the 
Internet through a computer or computers for which he has registered one 
or more domain names. Such an ISP typically provides the individual with 
a connection for the user’s personal computer, an e-mail account, and 
hosting for the individual’s web page on the ISP’s Internet server. The ISP 
also takes complete control of the user’s existence in cyberspace as soon 
as she logs on. 
If the ISP chooses to do nothing, the user can employ whatever soft-
ware she desires to experience cyberspace as she sees fit. She can view 
movie trailers, read about history, send e-mail, or “chat” with her friends. 
However, the ISP has the power and authority to alter this experience in 
whatever way it desires. For example, ISPs sometimes offer their users 
proprietary content such as news, stock quotes, or games. Like city plan-
ners, they can create meeting places, facilitate travel through cyberspace, 
and control the size of crowds.126 ISPs can also keep their users from visit-
ing certain parts of cyberspace, censor what they say and read, review 
their e-mail, monitor their behavior, and enforce codes of conduct. More-
over, an ISP can enforce its will because it controls the user’s ability to 
enter cyberspace. An ISP can “sentence” users who defy its rules by deny-
ing access to certain materials, logging them off for specified amounts of 
time, deleting files kept on the ISP’s server, or even terminating the user’s 
account completely.127 Moreover, it can do these things arbitrarily without 
                                                                                                                         
 125. See LESSIG, supra note 65, at 63-84 (discussing various “cyberspaces” and the 
characteristics chosen for them by their proprietors).  
 126. Perhaps the best example of this is America Online, which provides its users 
with special content, chat rooms, and Internet shortcuts not generally available to other 
Internet users. See LESSIG, supra note 65, at 66-71. 
 127. ISP user agreements that address these issues include Earthlink, Inc., Earthlink 
Internet Service Agreement [hereinafter Earthlink Agreement], available at http://www. -
earthlink.net/about/policies/dial/index.html (last modified March 7, 2000); NetZero, Inc., 
NetZero Services and NetZero Site Terms and Conditions [hereinafter NetZero Terms and 
Conditions], available at http://www.netzero.net/legal/serv_terms.html (last visited Nov. 
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providing notice, a hearing, or any other form of due process.128 In “real 
space,” the power to behave this way rests with the state. In cyberspace, 
however, it belongs to the cyberlord.129 
Almost every cyberlord exercises the same power as ISPs by dictating 
the experience of those who connect to his computer. In some cases, the 
appearance of the virtual state is clear because the cyberlord creates a vir-
tual community that comes with a governing “constitution.”130 In other 
cases, the appearance of state power seems nonexistent because the site 
                                                                                                                         
16, 2002); America Online, Inc., America Online Member Agreement, § 7 [hereinafter 
AOL Agreement], available at http://legal.web.aol.com/aol/aolpol/memagree.html (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2002); AT&T, AT&T Broadband Web Site Agreement [hereinafter AT&T 
Agreement], available at http://www.attbroadband.com/services/other/TermsConditions.-
html (last visited Nov. 16, 2002). These agreements demonstrate that ISPs have the au-
thority and technical power to perform the actions described. Such authority and power 
exist even in the absence of user agreements because existing law does not regulate the 
terms and conditions of Internet service. 
 128. See Rita Ferrandino, Sweaty Scenes from the Life of an AOL Censor, VILLAGE 
VOICE, Mar. 27, 2001, available at http://www.villagevoice.com/issues/0112/-
ferrandino.php (last visited Nov. 16, 2002) (describing activities of a person who en-
forced America Online’s Terms of Service against the service’s users). Some writers ad-
vocate the use of this power to have ISPs serve as Internet policemen. See Gibbons, supra 
note 1, at 523-34 (suggesting cooperation between ISPs for the purpose of enforcing 
standards of behavior in cyberspace as a desirable form of Internet self-regulation).  
 129. See LESSIG, supra note 65, at 24-42, 63-80 (describing how those in control of 
computers connected to the Internet can impose control on other Internet users); Joel R. 
Reidenberg, Governing Networks and Rulemaking in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 911, 
919 (1996) (“Networks themselves take on political characteristics as self-governing enti-
ties.”); Gibbons, supra note 1, at 493 (“Similar to feudal fiefdoms, each region, subre-
gion, college, or corporation is responsible for policing its part of cyberspace.”); Paul 
Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural Value of Applying 
Constitutional Norms to “Private” Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1263 (2000) (recog-
nizing the power acquired by private parties on the Internet and analyzing the possibility 
of applying constitutional norms to regulate them). 
 130. An example of such a community is Cybertown, a virtual community ostensibly 
“governed” by a constitution. See Cybertown, Inc., Cybertown Constitution, available at 
http://www.cybertown.com/info/about/details/constitution.html (last visited Aug. 16, 
2002). A famous incident involving a virtual rape in LamdaMOO clearly illustrates the 
similarity between the problems of governing such a site and the problems of “real space” 
government. In a nutshell, LamdaMOO is a virtual community in which users create 
characters who “live” in that space. One of LamdaMOO’s inhabitants, a “Mr. Bungle,” 
used his status and power to control certain female characters for the purpose of forcing 
them to participate in nonconsensual sexual activity. Mr. Bungle’s behavior presented the 
LamdaMOO community and its operators with the problem of figuring out what, if any-
thing, to do about Mr. Bungle’s behavior. In the end, Mr. Bungle’s character disappeared 
from the system, permanently banished by those in control. See Julian Dibbell, A Rape in 
Cyberspace, VILLAGE VOICE, Dec. 21, 1993, available at http://www.levity.com/julian/-
bungle_vv.html; LESSIG, supra note 65, at 74-78 (discussing the LamdaMOO incident). 
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offers users a limited experience such as pure text or technical connection 
to the Internet’s backbone. However, it is still the cyberlord’s choice, and 
not her inability, to offer the limited experience. The private power to 
shape and control the user’s experience still remains. 
The hierarchical organization of domain names and computers gives 
the Internet a distinctly feudal form of government. Cyberlords exercise 
the power of states as an incident of private property. Additionally, the 
continuous granting of cyberfiefs and their subsequent division means that 
this power resides in the hands of numerous cyberlords. The Internet’s 
government, like that of a feudal society, is highly fragmented. 
2. The Development of Cybermanors 
The modern cyberlord faces management problems similar to those 
confronted by feudal lords. A cyberlord who wishes to earn a fortune in 
cyberspace has to acquire a cyberfief, but possession of a cyberfief is not 
enough to ensure prosperity. Like the feudal lord, the cyberlord needs to 
attract and hold people to make his cyberfief economically productive. 
This happens at every level of the Internet’s feudal hierarchy. At the top, 
large cyberlords who provide direct connection to the Internet’s backbone 
look for other cyberlords who can profitably utilize Internet bandwidth. At 
the bottom, cyberlords try to attract ordinary individuals to do the same, 
but it is at this level that the cyberlord’s business turns to exploitation. 
At first blush, one might think that cyberlords could profit only if they 
somehow get their users to pay for the privilege of communicating with 
the cyberlord’s computer. This sometimes happens. For example, Internet 
users generally pay ISPs a fee in return for their Internet service. However, 
the cyberlord that limits herself to the collection of user fees is unlikely to 
maximize profits. Users in cyberspace are consumers in real space, and 
each of a cyberlord’s users represents an opportunity to sell or advertise 
something. ISPs and other web site operators must therefore attract and 
retain as many users as they can while connecting their users’ “cyberlives” 
to profits whenever possible.131 A profit maximizing strategy starts with 
                                                                                                                         
 131. A manual for such a management strategy is provided in the book NET GAIN by 
John Hagel III and Arthur G. Armstrong. The authors, who both work for McKinsey & 
Company, Inc., advocate the use of what they term “virtual communities” to gain com-
petitive advantages in Internet commerce. Among other things, they stress the importance 
of attracting users to the site, tracking their usage patterns, and creating disincentives for 
switching to rivals. JOHN HAGEL III & ARTHUR G. ARMSTRONG, NET GAIN: EXPANDING 
MARKETS THROUGH VIRTUAL COMMUNITIES 131-49 (1997). See also JOHN HAGEL III & 
MARC SINGER, NET WORTH: SHAPING MARKETS WHEN CUSTOMERS MAKE THE RULES 
(1999) (describing the “infomediary” as a model by which a business can profit from 
collection of customer information on the Internet). 
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the realization that users experience cyberspace through their com-
puters,132 that the cyberlord controls what the computer displays, and that 
the users’ attention, activities, and personal presence become resources 
that generate revenue for cyberlords.133  
The most obvious way to accomplish this is displaying advertisements 
to the user, which many commercial ISPs and web site operators do.134 
The value of such behavior should not be underestimated. Some ISPs ap-
parently forego user fees altogether in favor of raising revenue from ad-
vertisers willing to pay for the display of their ads on users’ screens.135 
Indeed, an aggressive ISP can constantly bombard its users with ads by 
displaying them upon login, on e-mail screens and in web browser win-
dows.136 At the extreme, a user could not be present in cyberspace without 
the companionship of advertisements. However, ISPs and other web site 
operators must always be mindful that the overly intrusive use of adver-
tisements may drive users away to competitors. If too many users leave, 
                                                                                                                         
 132. This includes the computer’s screen, audio speakers, keyboard, and any other 
input or output device. 
 133. See Suein L. Hwang, Ad Nauseum: Surfers Have Been Ignoring Online Market-
ing; So Advertisers are Trying Some Creative New Approaches, WALL STREET J., Apr. 
23, 2001, at R8 (describing the importance of more effective targeting of advertisements 
to internet users), available at 2001 WL-WSJ 2861169; F. T. McCarthy, We Have Lift-
Off, ECONOMIST, Feb. 3, 2001, (Business Special) (discussing the monetization of a con-
sumer’s attention or “eyeballs”), available at 2001 WL 7317530; Erick Schonfeld, How 
Much are Your Eyeballs Worth?, FORTUNE, Feb. 21, 2000, at 197 (describing how Inter-
net companies are valued by the number of customers they have), available at 2000 WL 
3461698; Kara Swisher, Boom Town: AOL Time Warner’s New Message to Subscribers: 
Crazy for You, WALL STREET J., May 14, 2001, at B1 (describing the importance of sub-
scriber attention), available at 2000 WL-WSJ 2863296. 
 134. For example, America Online displays an advertisement to each subscriber im-
mediately after she logs in. The subscriber must then respond whether she is interested in 
the product before she can access her account. Advertisements continue to appear on 
practically every screen viewed by the user. Earthlink displays advertisements on web 
browser pages that ordinarily appear when the customer begins surfing the Internet. Ya-
hoo!, Lycos, and Excite display advertisements on practically every page viewed by their 
users. See Yahoo!, Inc., Yahoo!, available at http://www.yahoo.com; Lycos, Inc., Lycos 
Home Page, available at http://www.lycos.com; Excite Network, Inc., My Excite, avail-
able at http://www.excite.com. 
 135. See Schonfeld, supra note 133 (describing how NetZero forgoes subscription 
fees in return for higher advertisement revenue). 
 136. For example, America Online users are rarely without the company of adver-
tisements when online, particularly when they are in chatrooms or viewing America 
Online’s proprietary content. See, e.g., America Online, Inc., Welcome to AOL Anywhere, 
available at http://www.aol.com. See also Schonfeld, supra note 133 (describing 
NetZero’s aggressive use of advertisements).  
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the value of the cyberlord’s advertisement program will decrease, and 
profits will decrease. 
The savvy cyberlord can increase the revenue raised from advertise-
ments by diligently collecting information about his users. Sometimes this 
information is voluntarily disclosed in exchange for services. For example, 
ISPs sometimes offer to track a user’s stocks or pay her bills online. This 
can provide valuable clues about a user’s wealth. Additionally, users leave 
many clues about themselves as they move through cyberspace. Some 
visit web sites devoted to sports. Others go to virtual bookstores. Still oth-
ers look for stock tips. Cyberlords who record this information can direct 
advertisements to targeted audiences.137 They can put ads for golf clubs on 
the screens of sports buffs, links to bookstores on the screens of book-
worms, and ads for brokerage services on the screens of investors. The 
narrow targeting of these ads makes them more valuable to advertisers, so 
the cyberlord can charge more for their display.138 If a cyberlord records 
what his users buy in cyberspace, he has an even better idea of what could 
be sold to his users and profit from that information as well.139 A cyber-
lord could even charge a merchant a percentage of all sales made to users 
who are directed to the merchant’s web site by the cyberlord.140 Even if a 
cyberlord chooses not to use this information himself, he can still profit by 
selling it to someone who will.141 
                                                                                                                         
 137. See Hwang, supra note 133 (noting how web sites use tracking technology to 
improve the value of advertisements on the Internet); Chip Bayers, The Promise of One 
to One (A Love Story), WIRED, May 1998 (reporting that web sites gather information 
about Internet users for the purposes of advertising and sales), available at 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/6.05/one_to_one.html; Schonfeld, supra note 133 
(stating that NetZero monitors every move of its subscribers on the Internet for the pur-
pose of delivering targeted advertisements). 
 138. See Schonfeld, supra note 133 (noting that NetZero’s superior targeting of ad-
vertisements increases its revenues); McCarthy, supra note 133 (reporting that Yahoo! 
targeted ads by observing user behavior, and that such ads sell for 30-60 times as much as 
untargeted ads); Paul C. Judge, Will Online Ads Ever Click?, FAST COMPANY, Mar. 1, 
2001, at 182 (discussing importance of targeting for advertisements and role played by 
gathering of information about customers in effective advertising), available at 2001 WL 
2074101. 
 139. See HAGEL & ARMSTRONG, supra note 131, at 131-49 (detailing business strat-
egy for vendors to use Internet sites to increase effectiveness of marketing and sales ef-
forts, particularly through the gathering of information about users). 
 140. See Swisher, supra note 133 (reporting the statement of Bob Pittman, the then 
co-chief operating officer of AOL Time Warner, that future revenue will come from sub-
scription fees, add-on products, and the ability to “rent the relationship” to others). 
 141. See Thomas E. Weber, Network Solutions Sells Marketers its Web Database, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 2001, at B1 (reporting that Network Solutions, the unit of VeriSign 
that operates significant portions of the DNS, is offering its database of individuals and 
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Cyberlords can also raise revenue by effectively managing the per-
sonal presence that their users establish in cyberspace. Any web site op-
erator can easily give users space on a server for the display of the user’s 
web page.142 Users create these pages for a wide range of reasons. Some-
times the reasons seem whimsical, as when individuals display pictures of 
their pets.143 At other times the reasons are quite serious, as when users 
advertise or operate businesses of their own.144 Either way, users put up 
web pages in hopes of attracting visitors. These visitors represent a second 
audience to whom ads can be shown. The cyberlord can view the user’s 
web page, determine the audience likely to view the page, and target ad-
vertisements to that audience.145 
Really astute cyberlords, however, can accomplish even more by turn-
ing their users’ personalities into sources of revenue. Of all the things that 
attract and hold people in cyberspace, human interaction has proven 
highly effective. This can hardly be surprising. After all, in real space, 
people generally form their most powerful and long lasting relationships 
                                                                                                                         
business who have registered domain names), available at 2001 WL-WSJ 2854616; Nick 
Wingfield & Glenn R. Simpson, With so Much Subscriber Data, AOL Walks a Cautious 
Line on Privacy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2000, at B1 (reporting that AOL possesses a large 
amount of data that would generate huge revenue if sold), available at 2000 WL-WSJ 
3021761. See also Chris Gaither, Microsoft Poised to Lead .Net Shift, BOSTON GLOBE, 
July 29, 2002, at C1 (describing how Microsoft plans to exploit new markets for Web 
services, particularly the hosting of software on servers, “to allow a much richer ex-
change of information between vast repositories of corporate or personal information”), 
available at 2002 WL 4140792.  
 142. Practically all commercial ISPs offer this service to their subscribers. Addition-
ally, a number of web site operators offer free web page hosting on the Internet. See Ya-
hoo!, Inc., Yahoo! GeoCities, available at http://geocities.yahoo.com/home (offering web 
page hosting); Lycos, Inc., Tripod, available at http://www.tripod.lycos.com (same). 
 143. See, e.g., Orchid Fung, Welcome to the World Wide Web’s First Golden Re-
triever WebRing!, available at http://www.geocities.com/Heartland/1763/goldring.html 
(last updated Feb. 10, 2002) (connecting multiple sites devoted to golden retriever dogs). 
 144. See e.g., Lycos, Inc., Tripod Small Business, available at http://www.tripod. -
lycos.com/smallbiz/index.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2002) (offering information and 
software tools for users to create small Internet businesses).  
 145. See, e.g., Black Stone Productions, About Black Stone Equine, available at 
http://black_stone_equine.tripod.com (last updated Nov. 13, 2002) (business web page 
with banner advertisements placed by the host service provider); The Portable Bistro 
Home Page, available at http://portablebistro.tripod.com (last visited Nov. 16, 2002) 
(business web page with a “pop up” advertisement from the host service provider).  
  The practice of placing advertisements on users’ web pages is reminiscent of the 
manorial practice of requiring serfs to till the lord’s fields along with their own. See HALL 
& ALBION, supra note 82, at 71. The Internet equivalent of a plot of land is a web page. 
By making his own “plot of land” more attractive and more valuable, the cyberserf makes 
the cyberlord’s web site more valuable too.  
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with other people. Thus, a clever cyberlord provides users the opportunity 
to chat or otherwise interact “real time” with fellow users in the hope that 
these users will develop cyberspace relationships. Cyberlords who control 
access to such users can sell that access. Indeed, the value of such access 
increases with the number of users available and the intensity of the per-
sonal relationships formed. An individual who “sees” a dear friend only in 
cyberspace will pay more to maintain that connection and will spend more 
time connected to the cyberlord’s site. The increased time spent in cyber-
space makes the individual more available for exposure to advertisements 
and other commercial opportunities controlled by the cyberlord. More-
over, the user’s increased presence itself attracts more users who in turn 
increase the value of the access controlled by the cyberlord.146 
America Online’s proprietary chatrooms offer an excellent example of 
this. These chatrooms, which only AOL subscribers can access, are organ-
ized around themes of common interest. Many of these themes are chosen 
by the subscribers themselves, and many of the chatrooms have “regulars” 
who routinely spend a number of hours there every day talking to online 
friends while also gaining exposure to the ads placed in chatroom win-
dows. Some of AOL’s subscribers use the service specifically to gain ac-
cess to these chatrooms and the friends found there.147 AOL understands 
that the value of its “estate” increases as it attracts more subscribers to its 
chatrooms and has even recruited its users as “volunteers” who build these 
communities in exchange for various perks that have included reduced-fee 
access.148  
The foregoing shows that cyberlords manage their cyberfiefs like feu-
dal manors. Like feudal serfs, “cyberserfs” live “cyberlives” managed by 
                                                                                                                         
 146. See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC 
GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 174 (1999) (“Whether real or virtual, networks have 
a fundamental economic characteristic: the value of connecting to a network depends on 
the number of other people already connected to it.”); LARRY DOWNES & CHUNKA MUI, 
UNLEASHING THE KILLER APP: DIGITAL STRATEGIES FOR MARKET DOMINANCE 23-28 
(1998) (discussing network effects and the rapid increase of a network’s value as the 
number of users increases); John M. Gallaugher & Yu-Ming Wang, Network Effects and 
the Impact of Free Goods: An Analysis of the Web Server Market, INT’L J. ELECTRONIC 
COM., Summer 1999, at 66, 68-69 (reviewing literature about network externalities), 
available at http://www2.bc.edu/~gallaugh/research/ijec99/ijec99.html. 
 147. See DOWNES & MUI, supra note 146, at 103 (1998) (describing the value of 
AOL’s chatrooms). 
 148. See Lisa Margonelli, Inside AOL’s “Cyber-Sweatshop”, WIRED MAG., Oct. 
1999, available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/7.10/volunteers.html. Credit is 
owed to Hector Postigo for drawing this to the author’s attention at the Association of 
Internet Researchers Conference in October 2001. See also Hector Postigo, Final Confer-
ence Paper (Oct. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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their lord for the lord’s financial gain. As such, the cyberserf becomes an 
asset owned by the cyberlord’s business. Indeed, as the term “buying eye-
balls” suggests, cyberlords sometimes acquire existing cyberfiefs because 
they deem the cyberserfs valuable.149 Even when businesses are not being 
bought and sold, cyberlords remain keenly aware that their relationships 
with cyberserfs are valuable assets that can be “rented” to others.150 This 
does not, however, mean that cyberlords routinely abuse their cyberserfs. 
Just like their medieval counterparts, cyberlords have to limit the exploita-
tion of their cyberserfs because overexploitation will drive cyberserfs to 
join the cybermanors of his competitors.151 
V. THE EFFECT OF THE FEUDAL SOCIETY METAPHOR  
The Feudal Society metaphor challenges the Western Frontier meta-
phor by diverting attention from romanticized images of the West to the 
darker ones of feudal Europe. Like America’s Western Frontier, medieval 
Europe had abundant land that governments found difficult to control. 
However, these conditions did not give rise to a happy European version 
of the Western Frontier experience. Instead, Europe endured three centu-
ries of feudal rule that declined only as the evolving modern state ex-
panded its regulation of otherwise private feudal arrangements.152 The 
Feudal Society metaphor contradicts the idea that plentiful land and mini-
mal government regulation ensure widespread freedom and prosperity. 
Indeed, the metaphor implies that such conditions support the fragmenta-
tion of political authority and the private exercise of political power. By 
doing so, the metaphor draws attention to the many instances where, as in 
medieval Europe, weak states created political vacuums ultimately filled 
by powerful individuals and clans who governed for private gain. These 
historical examples make it difficult to accept the Western Frontier meta-
phor’s historical prediction of a glorious future in cyberspace. Rather than 
presume that things will work out simply because cyberspace resembles 
                                                                                                                         
 149. See DOWNES & MUI, supra note 146, at 102-04 (“The real value in a digital 
community comes from its participants.”). See also supra note 133. 
 150. See supra note 140.  
 151. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (describing possible loss of serfs as a 
meaningful limitation on the degree of exploitation that feudal lords could practice). See 
also HAGEL & ARMSTRONG, supra note 131, at 146-49 (making the imposition of switch-
ing costs that make it hard for users to leave a particular Internet community a key com-
ponent of Internet business strategy). 
 152. See STRAYER, supra note 82, at 67 (associating the end of feudalism with the 
rise of the sovereign state); COQUILLETTE, supra note 82, at 107-13, 565-69 (describing 
the role of the statutes Quia Emptores and De Donis in the decline of feudalism, and dis-
cussing the change from feudal society to liberal society). 
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the romanticized Western Frontier, society must choose the kind of cyber-
space that it will have.153 
Admittedly, one basis for rejecting this idea is that the institutions and 
practices emerging in cyberspace do not perfectly mirror those of feudal 
Europe. Armed retainers do not exist in cyberspace,154 and cyberserfs do 
not face the same degree of subordination that medieval serfs endured.155 
                                                                                                                         
 153. The disintegration of political order and the rise of private warlords in Afghani-
stan and Somalia offer grim reminders of what can happen, even in the 21st century, 
when a country has abundant land and minimal government. The transformation of 20th 
century countries into 21st century quasi-feudal territories is related to Roberto Unger’s 
observation that societies continually cycle through periods characterized by social cus-
tom, positive rules built on custom, the rule of law (i.e. liberal society), and the decline of 
law (postliberal society). See ROBERTO M. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A 
CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY 238-42 (1976). Daniel Coquillette has taken Unger’s ideas 
about cycling and inserted new terminology, thereby suggesting that societies naturally 
start with a tribal phase in which local custom prevails, then experience feudalism, de-
velop into liberal states, and finally pass through a postliberal phase in which the rule of 
law fails. Societies in the postliberal phase eventually return to the tribal phase. See CO-
QUILLETTE, supra note 82, at 565. Ideas like this predict the development of phenomena 
like cyberspace which weaken the state and its rule of law, leading society back to the 
tribal phase and once again to feudalism. Of course, it remains to be seen whether cyber-
space will actually have this effect. However, the possibility of this seems undeniable. If 
society deems such a path undesirable, it should consider what steps might be taken now 
to prevent the predicted demise of liberal society. 
 154. See STRAYER, supra note 82, at 13 (including armed retainers in definition of 
feudalism); BLOCH, supra note 82, at 446 (noting the importance of the military in me-
dieval feudalism). One could think of computer security experts as the Internet equivalent 
of armed retainers. Internet computer operators live with the constant threat of attacks in 
the form of viruses, worms, and hacks. Computer security experts write anti-virus pro-
grams and construct security systems to defend against these attacks, thereby providing 
services similar to those provided by feudal armed retainers. However, one should also 
keep in mind that computer security experts do not swear oaths of loyalty to their em-
ployers, so the similarity between modern computer security experts and feudal armed 
retainers is limited. 
 155. If one strictly limits the comparison to humans who lived as medieval serfs and 
the humans who become cyberserfs when they log on to the Internet, this statement is 
true. However, if a person’s cyberspace identity has significance independent of any real 
space person, as suggested by at least one academic, things look different. See Curtis E. 
A. Karnow, The Encrypted Self: Fleshing Out the Rights of Electronic Personalities, 13 
J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1 (1994). Although every cyberspace identity 
corresponds to a real space person, there are clearly cyberspace identities with no true 
real space counterpart because people deliberately assume cyberspace identities that are 
different from those they have in real space. For example, a person may choose to 
conceal his or her racial identity or gender. Others might reveal personal struggles with 
substance abuse or family history only in cyberspace because conversations about those 
issues cannot easily be linked to a real space life. Still others could fabricate entire 
personas for purposes of a cyberspace life. See Kang, supra note 65, at 1133-34 
(recounting an Asian American man’s experiences in cyberspace while under the identity 
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However, metaphors may provide insight without perfectly describing the 
things they illuminate. The Western Frontier metaphor offers insight de-
spite its imperfections. The Feudal Society metaphor does likewise by 
suggesting a very complicated future for the denizens of a cyberspace 
dominated by unregulated private ordering. Instead of being free and 
prosperous, these denizens may find themselves controlled and exploited 
by superiors in a technological hierarchy of power. In order to prevent 
this, a society should use the Feudal Society metaphor to find examples of 
emerging feudal practices, and then focus on these problems and how they 
can be blunted by the application of law. 
A. User Exit and Emerging Feudal Practices 
ISP regulation is one example of how the Feudal Society metaphor 
might affect the application of law to cyberspace. As noted earlier, sup-
porters of minimal Internet regulation often argue that easy exit in cyber-
space gives users the power to avoid ISPs and others who treat them 
poorly. Cyberlords will ultimately fail in their efforts to exploit because 
exploited cyberserfs will surely leave. Accordingly, there is no good rea-
son to regulate the operations of ISPs.156 
The Feudal Society metaphor implies that this conclusion is a bit pre-
mature. While genuinely free exit would help control exploitative behavior 
in cyberspace, the Feudal Society metaphor suggests that cyberlords will 
try to defeat free exit by creating “sticky” relationships that increase the 
value of their cybermanors.157 Cyberlords who exploit barriers to exit will 
not only profit from the increased number of cyberserfs that they control, 
but also from the willingness of those cyberserfs to tolerate more onerous 
conditions than those tolerated by cyberserfs who are truly free to leave. 
Indeed, as noted below, the decision to leave an ISP sometimes has suffi-
cient costs to undercut an “exit cures everything” strategy to Internet pol-
                                                                                                                         
American man’s experiences in cyberspace while under the identity of an African Ameri-
can man). 
  The existence of separate cyberspace identities means that those virtual people 
exist totally within the confines of cyberspace. As such, the exploitation they face in 
cyberspace is not necessarily offset by the mitigating circumstances of real space. When 
an ISP deletes certain cyberspace identities, no real space counterpart carries on. In cases 
like these, an ISP acquires a great deal of power over a cyberspace person because the 
ISP has the power and authority to terminate the user’s account and by extension the cy-
berspace person’s very existence. This degree of power seems relatively comparable to 
the power of feudal lords over serfs. 
 156. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. 
 157. See supra Part IV.C.2. 
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icy. It therefore makes sense to consider passing laws that dismantle exist-
ing barriers to exit and prevent future creation of such barriers.  
Consider first the exit options available to a casual Internet user, the 
kind who occasionally visits cyberspace to read about bicycle racing in 
Europe and get e-mail from one or two friends. Such a person would 
probably consider most ISPs fungible because they all would give her an 
e-mail account and allow her to read about bicycle racing. Leaving one 
ISP for another would therefore cost her very little, and she would theo-
retically be very prone to switching as long as the new ISP treats her bet-
ter.  
In practice, however, an ordinary Internet user cannot easily find a 
new ISP who offers a better deal. Despite the existence of many ISPs,158 
industry consolidation means that most users will encounter only a small 
number of ISPs who offer relatively similar packages.159 Moreover, users 
considering a switch will have to scrutinize lengthy user and privacy poli-
cies that they will find difficult to understand because their casual use of 
the Internet makes them unfamiliar with the nuances of Internet service.160 
ISPs can add to these problems by imposing requirements for termination 
of an account. For example, ISPs sometimes refuse to accept e-mail termi-
nations of an account. Instead, users must cancel by U.S. mail, registered 
mail, or telephone.161 ISPs also use customer service representatives to 
talk canceling users out of their decisions.162 These impediments may not 
seem terribly burdensome, but they are enough to exploit human inertia 
and indifference. As noted earlier, a casual user of the Internet has little at 
stake in her choice of ISPs. She is willing to move for a better deal, but her 
indifference makes it unlikely that another ISP can offer anything of great 
                                                                                                                         
 158. Gregg Keizer, The Best and Worst ISPs, PC WORLD, Nov. 1, 2000, at 148 
(reporting that 7,400 ISPs exist), available at 2000 WL 9395596. 
 159. See Kathryn Balint, The Ins and Outs of Choosing a Service Provider, SAN 
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 13, 2000, at 6 (reporting that six ISPs—America Online, Mi-
crosoft Network, EarthLink, CompuServe, AT&T WorldNet, and NetZero—account for 
nearly 75% of the nation’s total online audience), available at 2000 WL 13970183. 
 160. For example, the NetZero user agreement and privacy policy occupy twelve 
single spaced pages, enough to deter many laypersons from thorough review. 
 161. See AOL Agreement, supra note 127, at § 7 (stating that cancellation must take 
place by telephone, fax or U.S. mail); Earthlink Agreement, supra note 127, at § 10 
(same). 
 162. See Balint, supra note 159 (reporting that America Online customers find it dif-
ficult to terminate their subscriptions in part because of the sales pitch given upon at-
tempts to cancel); Federal Trade Commission, Juno Online Services Settles FTC Charges 
of Internet Service Advertisements (May 15, 2001) (FTC News Release) (reporting con-
sent agreement between FTC and Juno Online Services, Inc. concerning practices “that 
made it unreasonably difficult for some customers to cancel” service), 2001 WL 513200. 
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value. Consequently, small inconveniences and costs can slow the exit rate 
of casual users. 
Barriers that affect whether serious Internet users will change ISPs are 
different than the ones described above. Not surprisingly, serious users are 
a cyberlord’s most valuable cyberserfs. They see more ads and they are 
more likely to buy lots of merchandise. They spend more time creating 
attractive web pages that bring more users to the ISP’s site. ISPs therefore 
have particular reason to hold on to serious users. However, as will be 
shown here, the circumstances that deter casual Internet users from 
switching have less effect on serious Internet users. Nevertheless, the feu-
dal organization of the Internet helps ISPs hold on to these valuable cyber-
serfs. 
Like casual users, serious Internet users are willing to switch ISPs if 
they can get a better deal from someone else. However, serious users ap-
proach their decisions differently because they are more likely to have 
made a commitment to a particular cyberspace identity. For example, seri-
ous Internet users often have a web page on their ISP’s server and many 
friends or business contacts who reach them by e-mail.  
In one sense, it is easier for a serious Internet user to switch ISPs. His 
familiarity with the Internet increases the likelihood that he will receive 
accurate information about rival ISPs and understand the nuances of vari-
ous user agreements. His intensity of Internet use means that he has more 
to gain or lose from a better deal, and this will make him more willing to 
fight his way through the obstacles that deter casual Internet users. 
In another sense, however, it is much more difficult for a serious Inter-
net user to switch ISPs and change communities in cyberspace. For exam-
ple, a person who has developed a cyberspace identity loses it when he 
changes ISPs. E-mail addresses generally incorporate the ISP’s domain 
name, as do the URLs of web pages.163 These domain names belong to 
ISPs because ISPs have claimed ownership through the relevant TLD reg-
istry. Users who switch ISPs can therefore no longer use the names by 
which they are known and found in cyberspace.164 
For casual users, loss of an e-mail address is no big deal because it is 
easy to give a new e-mail address to a short list of correspondents. By con-
                                                                                                                         
 163. The web page’s URL usually contains the ISP’s domain name (i.e. 
www2.bc.edu/~yen), and an e-mail address ends with the ISP’s domain (i.e. 
yen@bc.edu). See GRALLA, supra note 15, at 16, 144-45. 160-71. 
 164. See LESSIG, supra note 65, at 202 (describing how users have difficulty chang-
ing communities in cyberspace). An example of this if offered by an AOL volunteer who 
is reluctant to be publicly identified when speaking about AOL for fear of losing her 
AOL account and online identity. Margonelli, supra note 148. 
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trast, someone with hundreds or thousands of e-mail correspondents could 
easily lose touch with a number of them.165 Most heavy e-mail users do 
not have the e-mail addresses of everyone who sends e-mail to them, so at 
the very least a certain percentage of those correspondents will find that 
the user has “disappeared.”166 Similar problems may arise when a web 
page is moved from one server to another. This does not mean that switch-
ing ISPs is an insurmountable problem for serious Internet users. Serious 
users can and do switch ISPs. However, it is clear that the decision to 
switch ISPs has costs for serious users, and these costs seem large enough 
to impede their exit rate.  
The Feudal Society metaphor shows that ISPs will try to create, main-
tain, and exploit barriers to user exit because those barriers increase the 
value of cyberfiefs.167 If free user exit is to play a significant role in pre-
venting the exploitation of individuals in cyberspace, it seems worthwhile 
to seriously consider using law to lower barriers to user exit. If an ISP's 
ownership of domain names, URLs, and e-mail addresses raise the costs of 
switching, the state could lower the relevant costs by requiring ISPs to 
automatically forward e-mails and redirect users looking for relocated web 
pages. It might even be appropriate to give users limited licenses to use 
domain names, URLs, and e-mail addresses after leaving an ISP. Addi-
tionally, if casual users find it difficult to determine whether their ISPs are 
offering good deals, a state could force ISPs to disclose basic information 
about service to users in standard formats that make comparison shopping 
easy.168  
                                                                                                                         
 165. See Lemley, supra note 73, at 1269 n.55 (noting that distribution of an e-mail 
address to numerous correspondents makes it harder to leave an ISP). 
 166. See David Coursey, ISP Switch? Learn My Secrets for Holding on to Your E-
mail, ZDNet AnchorDesk (describing loss of e-mail addresses as a problem when switch-
ing ISPs and partial solutions for handling the problem), available at http://www. -
zdnet.com/anchordesk/stories/story/0,10738,2767997,00.html (June 4, 2001). 
 167. Proponents of a laissez-faire approach may argue that sophisticated Internet us-
ers can easily avoid these problems by registering and administering their own Internet 
domains. It is true that users who register their own domain names can establish identities 
not owned by their ISPs. However, there are still problems with this as a panacea to the 
problem of cyberserfhood. First, it is unlikely that casual users will know enough about 
the Internet to register their own domains and configure the necessary technology. Sec-
ond, by the time they become the serious users who are able to do this, they then must 
face the loss of their ISP-owned name. Again, the point is not that exit is impossible, but 
that significant obstacles to exit exist. 
 168. The federal government already imposes similar requirements on consumer 
mortgage lenders. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693 (2000) (regulating disclosure of finance 
charges and annual percentage rate); 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (2000) (regulating disclo-
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B. Contracts of Adhesion and Emerging Feudal Practices 
Enforcement of adhesion contracts between cyberlords and cyberserfs 
is another example of how the Feudal Society metaphor might affect the 
application of law to cyberspace. Consider the standard agreement be-
tween an ISP and its subscriber. ISPs generally set the terms of these 
agreements on a “take it or leave it” basis, and they expressly permit ISPs 
to collect information about their users, enforce codes of conduct, change 
the agreement unilaterally, and terminate a user’s account without no-
tice.169 When one applies the Feudal Society metaphor, these agreements 
bear some resemblance to feudal pledges of loyalty and fealty, and they 
signal the cyberserf’s acceptance of a cyberlife in service to the cyber-
lord.170 
                                                                                                                         
sures about closing costs). Such disclosures help consumers choose among deals that 
might otherwise be impossible to compare. 
 169. See Earthlink Agreement, supra note 127 (containing terms granting the ISP 
broad rights to monitor and control the subscriber’s Internet use); NetZero Terms and 
Conditions, supra note 127 (same); AOL Agreement, supra note 127 (same); AT&T 
Agreement, supra note 127 (same). 
 170. For example, the America Online Member Agreement and AT&T Broadband 
Agreement grant broad licenses to the ISP concerning the use of the subscriber’s intellec-
tual property. See AOL Agreement, supra note 127, § 3 (containing provision that the user 
grants AOL the “complete right to use, reproduce, modify, distribute, etc. the content in 
any form, anywhere.”); AT&T Agreement, supra note 127, § 2 (“You agree to grant to 
AT&T Broadband a nonexclusive, royalty-free, worldwide, perpetual license, with the 
right to sublicense, to reproduce, distribute, transmit, create derivative works of, publicly 
display and publicly perform any materials and other information (including, without 
limitation, ideas contained therein for new or improved products and services) you sub-
mit to public areas of the Service (such as bulletin boards, forums and newsgroups) by all 
means and in any media now known or hereafter developed.”). The NetZero subscriber 
agreement states that NetZero will collect information about where users go and “may” 
make that information available to third parties. See NetZero Terms and Conditions, su-
pra note 127, § 1.0. A “cookie” is a text file that: 
allows Web sites to recognize particular users on future visits, enabling Web sites to pro-
vide personalized information or to automate the log in process. On some sites, cookies 
are essential for navigation. Cookies were originally designed to be contained within a 
specific site; however, when set by an ad server . . . they can be read by any server in the 
ad company’s domain, no matter what URL the browser is displaying or what site is on 
the screen. Thus, one company can collect information on a particular individual’s activi-
ties on any number of sites. 
Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Protecting Consumer Privacy: Are You Prepared?, 
N.Y.L.J., Apr. 11, 2000, at 3, reprinted in Jane Kaufman Winn & James R. Wrathall, 
Who Owns the Customer? The Emerging Law of Commercial Transactions in Electronic 
Customer Data, 56 BUS. LAW. 213, 223 (2000). See also Jerry Kang, Information Privacy 
in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1227-29 (1998) (describing use of 
cookies); Schwartz, supra note 65, at 1624-26 (same). 
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To what extent should contracts like these be enforced? As adhesion 
contracts, they vary from the ideals of contract law. The parties do not ne-
gotiate over the contract’s terms. Additionally, the contracts are often pre-
sented at a time when the offeree is unlikely to review the terms of the 
deal. Finally, adhesion contracts are often lengthy documents that ordinary 
individuals may find difficult to understand. These problems indicate that 
adhesion contracts rarely embody the genuine assent of the offeree, and 
the likelihood exists that ISPs use their service agreements to impose con-
ditions that the users neither agree to, know of, nor understand.171 
Despite these problems, courts generally enforce adhesion contracts in 
cyberspace.172 However, courts leave open the possibility that particular 
provisions of adhesion contracts will be found unenforceable if those pro-
visions are unconscionable or violate public policy.173 Therefore, the vi-
                                                                                                                         
 171. See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 1174, 1179 (1983) (defining and analyzing contracts of adhesion); Saul 
Litvinoff, Consent Revisited: Offer, Acceptance, Option, Right of First Refusal, and Con-
tracts of Adhesion in the Revision of the Louisiana Law of Obligations, 47 LA. L. REV. 
699, 757-58 (1987) (describing problems of consent in adhesion contracts). 
 172. See Rakoff, supra note 171, at 1191-92 (discussing general enforceability of 
adhesion contracts). See also ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(enforcing a so-called “shrinkwrap” license that accompanied a CD-ROM containing a 
database of telephone numbers); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 
1997) (enforcing a software license that came with a personal computer); In re RealNet-
works, Inc., No. 00 C 1366, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6584, 2000 WL 631341 (N.D. Ill. 
May 8, 2000) (holding a “clickwrap” agreement valid and enforceable); Hotmail Corp. v. 
Van$ Money Pie, Inc., No. C98-20064, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10729, at *16-17, 1998 
WL 388389, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998) (concluding that plaintiff had strong likeli-
hood of success with respect to enforcing an online contract of adhesion). A recent case 
of interest is Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001). The Specht court held that the mere act of downloading software over the Internet 
was not enough to bind users to a license. Id. at 595-96. At the same time, however, the 
court endorsed the general enforceability of adhesion contracts, including clickwrap 
agreements. Id. at 592. Specht indicates that ISPs can create enforceable agreements as 
long as they induce customers to specifically indicate assent to the terms of adhesion con-
tracts. See id. at 595-96. The ease with which most users click “I accept” means that, as a 
matter of practice, ISPs and other Internet entities should have little trouble binding indi-
viduals to adhesion contracts on the Internet. For an interesting and thoughtful analysis of 
how adhesion contracts affect the use and availability of information on the Internet, see 
Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1025 (1998). 
 173. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449 (“Shrinkwrap licenses are enforceable unless their 
terms are objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in general (for example, if they 
violate a rule of positive law, or if they are unconscionable).”); In re RealNetworks, 2000 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6584, at 14-21 (considering, but rejecting, claim of unconscionability). 
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ability of feudal practices in cyberspace depends in part on how courts 
perceive various contractual provisions. 
The existing general enforcement of adhesion contracts in cyberspace 
is consistent with the Western Frontier metaphor’s dominance. That meta-
phor constructs cyberspace as a place where exploitation of ordinary indi-
viduals is very unlikely—certainly less likely than in real space. Due to 
the improbability of exploitation, courts correctly refuse to invalidate or 
curtail the provisions of adhesion contracts between cyberlords and cyber-
serfs. 
By contrast, the Feudal Society metaphor suggests that cyberspace 
does not automatically protect ordinary individuals from exploitation. In-
deed, it suggests that such exploitation is spreading in cyberspace and that 
computer technology facilitates exploitative feudal practices. If society 
wants to prevent this, a sensible response would be to construct or inter-
pret contract law to prohibit or regulate contractual provisions that support 
feudalism in cyberspace. This does not necessarily mean that unilateral 
changes to agreements, limited remedies, choice of forum clauses, unlim-
ited licenses of intellectual property from cyberserf to cyberlord, manda-
tory consent to data collection, or low limitations of liability could never 
be part of a contract between a cyberlord and cyberserf.174 The Feudal So-
ciety metaphor merely tells us that the present routine acceptance of such 
provisions is probably unwarranted. In order to curb potentially exploita-
tive methods, courts should therefore seriously consider scrutinizing the 
provisions of adhesion contracts in cyberspace more closely than they 
have in the past. 
C. Intellectual Property and Emerging Feudal Practices 
A third example of the Feudal Society metaphor’s insight is its illumi-
nation of how intellectual property operates in cyberspace. Intellectual 
property is typically understood as law that encourages innovative and 
creative activity by reducing the likelihood of free riding.175 However, the 
                                                                                                                         
 174. For examples of such provisions, see AOL Agreement, supra note 127 (unilateral 
changes in terms of service, limited remedies, choice of forum clauses, and broad intel-
lectual property licenses); AT&T Agreement, supra note 127 (unilateral changes in terms 
of service, choice of forum clauses, and broad intellectual property licenses); and NetZero 
Terms and Conditions, supra note 127 (collection of personal information, limits on li-
ability). 
 175. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (Congress shall have power “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inven-
tors the exclusive Rights to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”). Also see 
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) in which the 
Court states that 
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Feudal Society metaphor suggests that intellectual property also plays a 
role in the privatization of state functions and the ability of cyberlords to 
control cyberserfs.  
1. The DMCA and Creation of Private Judiciaries  
Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”)176 pro-
vides an example of how intellectual property law can be constructed to 
encourage the development of private judiciaries. The DMCA addressed 
the question of whether ISPs could be held liable for copyright infringe-
ment committed by their users.177 However, rather than clarifying the sub-
stantive law about such liability, the DMCA permits ISPs to avoid such 
liability as long as they assume the role of private courts that hear com-
plaints of copyright infringement. 
Among other things, ISPs who want to take advantage of the DMCA’s 
safe harbor provisions must designate an agent to receive written com-
plaints of copyright infringement committed by the ISPs users.178 These 
complaints must follow a specified format. Once ISPs receive such formal 
complaints, they must “expeditiously” disable access to the alleged in-
fringing material and notify the affected user of the complaint and the ac-
tion taken.179 The user then has the opportunity to respond with a denial of 
the initial allegation that requires the ISP to restore access to the material 
in question.180 However, if the complainant continues to press the action 
by filing an action in court, the ISP must again disable access to the in-
                                                                                                                         
[t]he monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither 
unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. 
Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important public pur-
pose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of 
authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow 
the public access to the products of their genius after the limited period 
of exclusive control has expired.  
The Court in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) stated:  
[t]he economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to 
grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of 
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public 
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and 
useful Arts.’ 
 176. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2002). 
 177. An extensive analysis of the relevant issues can be found in Alfred C. Yen, 
Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise 
Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L. J. 1833 (2000). 
 178. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2) (1998). 
 179. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C), (g)(2)(A). 
 180. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(C), (3)(C). 
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fringing material.181 The DMCA generally protects ISPs who follow these 
procedures from liability for their users’ infringements.182 
The DMCA encourages ISPs to behave like courts of first resort in 
cases of copyright infringement on the Internet. Copyright plaintiffs file a 
statutorily prescribed complaint.183 ISPs then investigate the allegation 
and, if the allegations seem plausible, essentially grant the plaintiff a tem-
porary restraining order against the defendant by disabling access to the 
alleged infringing material.184 Such action is probably enough to resolve 
many cases without resort to the public judicial system because defendants 
will often not contest the allegations made against them. In those cases 
where defendants choose to fight, the plaintiff can still enforce its virtual 
temporary restraining order by filing the appropriate action in a formal 
court of law.185 
Although the above-described procedures might seem sensible, they 
are actually quite problematic. People who litigate disputes in public 
courts expect judges to have no self-interest in the outcome. Indeed, 
judges ordinarily recuse themselves in cases where their personal finances 
may be at stake. By contrast, ISPs have an obvious financial interest in the 
cases they are asked to hear because the DMCA prohibits liability against 
ISPs who remove material from the Internet in response to complaints 
from copyright holders.186 This interest encourages ISPs to resolve initial 
doubts in favor of plaintiffs to the detriment of defendants. Additionally, 
these procedures benefit copyright plaintiffs since they can get more from 
private courts than they could get from public courts. The ease with which 
plaintiffs obtain virtual temporary restraining orders from ISPs stands in 
sharp contrast to what plaintiffs must do for real ones from public courts, 
where due process would otherwise require a hearing and posting of a 
bond.187  
The private justice meted out by ISPs under the DMCA has the very 
shortcoming associated with feudal justice. Feudal lords or henchmen sit-
ting in manorial courts would surely keep the lords’ interest in mind when 
                                                                                                                         
 181. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(C). 
 182. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c); Yen, supra note 177, at 1881-85 (describing requirements of 
the DMCA). 
 183. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3). 
 184. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C). 
 185. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(C). 
 186. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). 
 187. See Yen, supra note 177, at 1885-89 (analyzing the safe harbor provisions of the 
DMCA). 
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deciding cases,188 and so it is with ISPs under the DMCA. By contrast, the 
end of feudalism is associated with the rise of the liberal state and the rule 
of law.189 Modern liberal states expect formal disputes to be settled by 
judges who refer to legal rules without regard to their personal interest. 
Accordingly, the private justice mechanism created by the DMCA repre-
sents a step away from the liberal state back towards a feudal system of 
justice. It may therefore be desirable to curtail or eliminate intellectual 
property laws like the DMCA that encourage or require self-interested ju-
dicial behavior by private parties.  
2. Intellectual Property Cases and the Control of Cyberserfs 
The connection between intellectual property and the fight over cyber-
serfs can be seen in the three highly publicized cases of A&M Records, 
Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,190 Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc.,191 
and eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc.192 In Napster, the defendant Napster, 
Inc. operated a directory service that facilitated the swapping of MP3 files 
over the Internet.193 Napster users would use the Internet to log on to the 
Napster service and send a search request to Napster for a particular song 
or artist. Napster would respond with a list of all logged on Napster users 
who had the relevant files available for downloading. The user could then 
download the desired music directly from another user.194 Napster proved 
extremely popular, attracting some 36 million users.195 Many of these us-
ers committed copyright infringement.196 However, a consortium of record 
companies and music publishers chose not to enforce their rights directly 
against Napster’s users. Instead, they sued Napster for vicarious and con-
tributory copyright infringement, alleging that Napster itself was liable for 
the misbehavior of its users.197 The plaintiffs successfully obtained a pre-
liminary injunction against Napster.198 After settlement negotiations with 
the consortium collapsed, Napster sought to show the recording industry 
                                                                                                                         
 188. See BLOCH, supra note 82, at 359-60 (describing desire of lords to sit in judg-
ment in part because it was in the lords’ financial interest). 
 189. COQUILLETTE, supra note 82, at 565. 
 190. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 191. 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 192. 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
 193. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1011. 
 194. Id. at 1011-13. 
 195. See Andrew Morse, Judging Napster, INDUSTRY STANDARD, Oct. 27, 2000, 
available at http://www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,19760,00.html. 
 196. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1013-14. 
 197. Id. at 1011. 
 198. Id. at 1027. 
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had engaged in copyright misuse.199 Napster filed for bankruptcy in June 
2002.200 The case is ongoing. 
The Amazon.com case involved a dispute over Amazon’s patented 
“single-action” method for selling merchandise over the Internet.201 It al-
lowed customers to buy items with a single mouse-click and made use of 
the Amazon.com web page more convenient than competitors’ pages that 
required multiple clicks for purchases.202 The defendant Barnesandno-
ble.com adopted a similar method for taking orders without Amazon’s 
consent, and Amazon sued for patent infringement.203 Amazon obtained a 
preliminary injunction,204 but the Federal Circuit vacated the district 
court’s order.205 The case settled in March 2002.206  
In eBay, the plaintiff eBay operated a popular web site that offered 
auctions for various items.207 The defendant Bidder’s Edge, Inc. ran a web 
site that allowed users to view prices on multiple auction sites, including 
eBay’s, simultaneously.208 This made it easier for users to comparison 
shop because it obviated the need to visit multiple sites.209 Bidder’s Edge 
obtained its information about eBay by using software robots that sent re-
peated requests for items and prices to eBay.210 eBay objected to the de-
fendant’s practice, and sued, alleging causes of action in trespass, false 
advertising, trademark dilution, computer fraud and abuse, interference 
with prospective economic advantage, and unjust enrichment.211 eBay 
succeeded in obtaining a preliminary injunction on a trespass claim against 
Bidder’s Edge,212 but the case has since been settled.213 
                                                                                                                         
 199. Dawn C. Chmielewski, Judge Will Let Napster Probe Labels’ Conduct, SAN 
JOSE MERCURY-NEWS, Feb. 23, 2002, at 3, available at 2002 WL 14897580. 
 200. What’s News, Business and Finance, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2002, at A1, available 
at 2002 WL-WSJ 3396602. 
 201. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 
2001). 
 202. Id. at 1347-50. 
 203. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1231 
(W.D. Wash. 1999), vacated by 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 204. Id. at 1249. 
 205. Amazon.com, 239 F.3d at 1366. 
 206. Amazon Settles Suit Against Online Rival Over Buying Shortcut, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 8, 2002, B5, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3388159. 
 207. eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1060 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
 208. Id. at 1061-62. 
 209. Id. at 1062. 
 210. Id. at 1060-63. 
 211. Id. at 1063. 
 212. Id. at 1073. 
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Ordinarily, these cases would be viewed as three legally distinct intel-
lectual property disputes whose parties happen to include Internet busi-
nesses. Intellectual property laws, such as copyright and patent laws, exist 
to provide incentives for the creation of socially valuable works and in-
ventions.214 Given the philosophy behind the granting of intellectual prop-
erty rights, resolution of these cases therefore involves consideration of 
how property rights affect incentives for the creation of content distributed 
over the Internet, Internet business methods, and the maintenance of web 
sites. A court might find for the recording industry in Napster because do-
ing so gives copyright holders incentives to create music and distribute it 
online. A court might hold Amazon’s patent valid because it believes that 
such innovation would not occur without patent protection. eBay may 
have ultimately won because a court believed that such businesses could 
not be profitably maintained without a prohibition against the commercial 
use of information by others.  
By contrast, the Feudal Society metaphor ties these cases together by 
drawing our attention to the common struggle for the control of cyberserfs. 
By using what the plaintiff claimed as intellectual property, each defen-
dant was luring users away. The music industry wanted Napster users to 
visit the industry’s web sites, Barnesandnoble.com shoppers were ones 
that Amazon.com thought it had “captured” by pioneering Internet book 
selling, and eBay wanted to keep Bidder’s Edge users at the eBay site. 
Each plaintiff sued because it feared that the loss of cyberserfs would de-
stroy its cybermanor. These observations show that a wide variety of intel-
lectual property disputes may not really be about incentives for invention 
or creation, but about the allocation of power to control people who use 
the Internet. If that is so, the stakes in such cases have changed and we 
may need to rethink the desirability of strong intellectual property rights in 
cyberspace. It is one thing to decide cases about the control of economic 
rights related to innovation. It seems to be something quite different to de-
cide cases about the right to control people in their travels through cyber-
space. Perhaps some otherwise plausible claims of intellectual property 
should be limited in order to control undesirable, quasi-feudal practices. 
                                                                                                                         
 213. See Greg Wiles, eBay, Bidder’s Edge Settle Suit on Web Trespassing, Copy-
right, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Mar. 1, 2001, available at LEXIS, Bloomberg - All 
Bloomberg News. 
 214. See supra note 175. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This Article has shown the value of consciously developing alternate, 
complementary metaphors for cyberspace. The basic insight here is easily 
understood. If single metaphors necessarily miss valuable insights, an ef-
fective way to suggest the missing insights is the deployment of multiple 
metaphors with complementary insights.  
For example, the romanticized Western Frontier represents an ideol-
ogy that emphasizes individual autonomy, free markets and a weak state. 
The Western Frontier metaphor has a tendency to discount things that 
might justify relatively strong regulation of cyberspace. Accordingly, a 
person constructing a complementary metaphor to the Western Frontier 
metaphor should recognize this oversight and construct a metaphor whose 
foundation supports a stronger state. Deployment of the complementary 
metaphor permits the observer to affirm or dispute observations that 
emerge from the first metaphor. As this Article has shown, the Feudal So-
ciety metaphor does just that. 
Finally, it may be wise to take note of the people who originate meta-
phors and their particular points of view.215 For example, the Western 
Frontier metaphor arose among those who first used the Internet. They 
came to the Internet voluntarily, and they had a relatively large amount of 
influence over the Internet’s development. It made sense for them to see 
the Internet as a place of freedom and opportunity. By contrast, those who 
came later to the Internet do not necessarily share the same perspective. 
Later Internet users would have less say over the Internet’s shape, and it is 
entirely possible that they would consider Internet use a necessity of mod-
ern life and not an excellent technological adventure. They could easily 
associate the Internet with compulsion instead of freedom.216 The Feudal 
Society metaphor gives this perspective an opportunity to be considered. 
Abuses ignored by those trained to think of the Internet as the “wild west,” 
can be identified and addressed after adopting this alternate perspective. 
The metaphors studied by this Article are just two of the many meta-
phors that can be applied to the Internet. Together, they show the impor-
tance of exercising restraint when characterizing the Internet as a phe-
nomenon destined to bring freedom and prosperity. The Western Frontier 
metaphor conjures up a glorious tale of progress in cyberspace, but the 
                                                                                                                         
215 See Margaret Chon, Internet Law Symposium: Introduction, 20 SEATTLE U. L.R. 
613 (1997) (noting how metaphors used by symposium participants were closely related 
to the participants' attitudes towards government). 
216 An example of this might be an employee who does not enjoy using computers, 
but has been told by his employer to use e-mail and the world wide web as part of his job. 
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metaphor’s flaws make its historical lessons questionable. By contrast, the 
Feudal Society metaphor shows that very different historical lessons apply 
to the Internet, and that an unregulated Internet might damage the freedom 
and prosperity of ordinary individuals. Society should cast a wary eye on 
policies supported by the Western Frontier metaphor and study how it can 
use law to realize the Internet’s promise. 
